United States and Chinese Representation at the United Nations: A Study of Political and Legal Change by Rivera, Conchita Sapinoso
THE UNITED STATES AND CEINESE REPRESENTATION 
AT THE UNITED NATIONS: A STUDY OF 
POLITICAL ANO LEGAL CHANGE 
By 
CONCHITA SAPINOSO RIVERA 
# 
Bachelor of Science 
University of the Philippines 
Quezon City, Philippin~s 
1968 
Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate College 
of the Oklahoma State University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the Degree of 
MASTER OF ARTS 
May, 1973 
... ;_ 
T~ UNITED STATES AND CHINESE REPRESENTATION 
AT THE UNITED NATIONS: A STUDY OF 
POLITICAL AND LEGAL CHANGE 
Thesis Approved: 
~ ~/2-~~ ~~ Thesis Adviser ( 






JUN 1 1973 
I wish to express my profound appreciation to Dr. Raymond 
Habiby, my thesis adviser, for his invaluable assistance and 
guidance throughout this research. I also thank the members of my 
thesis committee, Dr. Clifford A. L. Rich and Proressor Harold Sare 
for their careful reading anq constructive criticisms. I wish to 
thank Dr. Rich for his suggestion of the problem. 
Lastly, I am indebted to my parents who havsbeen the source of 
encouragement, understanding and support throughout my graduate work, 
and to my relatives and friends for their help. 
iii 






INTRODUCTION . ~ . . . . . . . • • • 
Purpose of the Study ••••• 
Statement of the Problem • • , 
Method and Procedure ••••• 
Literature Review ••••••• 
• • • • • • • • • • 
. . . . . . . . . " 
• • • • • • • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
DEVEIOPMENT OF UNITED STAn:5 CHINA POLICY • • • • • • • 
Containment, Isolation, Non-Recognition 
and Moratorium •••••••••••• 
The Period of the Moratoriwn •••••• 
Patterns of Voting ••••••••••• 
. . . . . . . . . . 
• • • • • 
A REAPPRAISAL OF UNITED STATES POLicr • • • • • • • • • 











to Rapprochement • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 34 
The ''Important Question" Policy • • • • • • • • • • 39 
The Proposal of Dual Representation. • • • • • • • 52 
Patterns of Voting • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 62 
CONCLUSIONS • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . . 
68 
73 






LIST OF TABLES 
United Nations Votes Related to the China 
Questiqn, 19~0-60 ••••••••••• 
United Nations Votes Related to the China 
Question, 1961-71 ••••••••••• 
. . . . . . . 
. . . . • • • 








Purpose of the Study 
After twenty-two years of deliberation, the Un1ted Nations 
General Assembly in its twenty-sixth session finally resolved the 
dispute over Chinese representation. The Albanian resolution, 1 which 
paved the way for the seating of the representatives of the People's 
Republic of China and unseated the Nationalist Government of the 
Republic of China, by a simple majority defeated the United States 
resolution. 2 The General Assembly's action appeared to be, perhaps 
superficially more than realistically, a major defeat for American 
foreign policy in the United Nations, considering that the American-
sponsored "import~nt question resolut.ion" was rejected. 3 · 
\ 23-Power draft resolut.:ion was adopted. "Restore all the 
rights of the People's Republic of China and to recognize the repre-
sentatives of China to the United Nations, and to e~el forthwith the 
representatives ot Chiang Kai-shek from the place which they unlawfully 
occupied at the United Nations and in all its organizations related 
to it." "China: General Assembly Decides to Restor'e Its Rights to 
the People's Republic of China," United Nations Mqhthly Chronicle 
(New York, 1971), VIII, No. 10. 
2The representatives of the Nati~nalist Government withdrew and 
did not take part in further proceedings of the General Assembly 
before the Albanian resolution was adopted. 
322-Power draft resolution: ''That any proposal which would 
result in depriving the Republic of China of representation in the 
United Nations was an important question under Article 18 of the 
1 
2 
' The issue over Chinese representation in the United·· Nations began 
with the fifth session of the General Assembly in 1950 when a Special 
Committee was established to consider Chinese representation and 
report to the Assembly. ln its report, the Special Committee declared 
that it was unable to make any recommendations. On the closing day of 
t-· 
the fifth session, November 5, 1951, the Assembly decided simply to 
take note of the report.4 A moratoriu,m followed, and there was no 
substantial discussion of the question in the Genera\ A'ssembly until 
1961. 
The problem of representation stemmed from the fact-that there 
are two ~ facto governments--the Central People' s Government of the 
People's Republic of China on the ma.inland and the Nationalist Govern-
ment of the Republic of China in Taiwan. The Nationalist Government, 
which occupied the United Nations seat of the state of China, an 
original member of the United Nations, was e:x:pelled from~the Asian 
ma.inland in 1949. The Soviet Union resolution of 1950 called for the 
restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China as 
the representative of China. 5 From 1963 to 1971, the Albanian reso-
lution was debated annually until finally the People's Republic of 
China was seated. 
Charter requiring a two-th:i,rds majority vote." A 19....:power proposal 
affirming the right of representation of the People's Republic of 
China and affirming the continued right of representation of the 
Republic of China was not pressed to a vote. ~·; p. J!,. 
4"Question of the Representation of China in the General Assembly~ 
Decisions of the Fifth and Sixth ReguJ.ar Sessions (New York, 1953), 
Supplement No:-3' to Background Paper No. 46 (February- 25, 1952), p. 15. 
5Two resolutions of the Union.of Soviet Socialist Republic: 
3 
Statement of the Problem 
The purpose of this thesis is to describe the politics and 
rationales behind the twenty-one years •f exclusion ~romthe United 
Nations of the People' s Republic of China, to analyze the role of the 
United States in this policy, and to explain the reversal of policy 
by.which the People's Republic of China displaced the Republic of 
China as a permanent member of the United Nations. The hypothesis of 
this study is that the United States used its ~armous power and 
influence among the members of the United Nations to successfully 
block the representation of the People's Republic of China for twenty-
one years as a sanction for Chinese hostility towards the· United 
States, and that as China developed an independent ftJreign policy from 
Moscow and responded to American diplomatic initiatives for a bila-
teral modus vivendi in Asia, the United States deftly .. concurred in the --
seating of the Peking regime in the United Nations. 
This thesis will deal with the political and legal methods used 
by the United States for over twenty years to bar the People's Republic 
of China from the United Nations. It will attempt to show that the 
primary reasons for the exclusion of the People's Republic 1 of China 
were political. Although legal arguments were used ':during the dis-
A/1369 called for the General Assembly to decide that the_ representa-
tives of the Kuomintang group cannot take part in tn~ work of the 
General Assembly and its organs because they are not."~the representa-
tives of China; A/1370 called for the General Assembly ~o invite the 
representatives of the People's Government to take part-in the work 
of the General Assembly and its organs. United Nations Official 
Records .2£ the General Assembly, Fifth Session, September 19-
December 15, 1950 (New York, 1951), pp. 3 & 9. Hereafter cited as 
GAOR. -
4 
cussions, the political aspect of the problem tended to outweigh the 
legal aspects. 
At the end of the Second World War, the United States decided on 
a global strategy of containment against the Soviet Union. In r&.-
lation to Asia, the goal was to maintain and safeguard the security 
of Asian states from communist domination •. Fearing Chinese hegemony 
over the small Asian states, the United States pursued its policy of 
containment in Asia by means of a number of bilateral and collective 
military defense pacts with the snlall non-communist governments, and a 
concerted effort to isolate the People's Republic of China by means 
of diplomatic non-recognition, trade and travel embargoes, and ex-
clusion from the United Nations. 
The United States played the major role in keeping the People's 
Republic of Chi~ out of the United Nations. It employed its power 
and influence among its allies in order to secure compliance from 
them, and the United Nations was used to further United States policy 
by securing support for United States actions. As United States 
Ambassador Ball to the United Nations said, "the United Nations is an 
instrument of United States foreign policy just as it is an instrument 
6 of every other state." 
American efforts to exclude the People's Republic of China from 
the United Nations began with the policy of a moratorium, progressed 
to the "important question" formula, and evolved into the two Chinas 
policy. Changes in United States policy were affected by changes in 
6George Ball, "The United Nations and the Real World," U. S. 
The Department of State Bulletin (Washington D. C., 1962), XLVI, 
No. 1190 (April 16, 1962), p. 636. Hereafter cited as Bulletin. 
,the international system, the structural framework of the United 
\>o 
Nations and by American domestic politics. The so-called "duopoly" 
arising from the power structure in the early 1950's had worked 
favorably for the United States dl.:II'ing the period of the moratorium. 
But in 1961, the issue of Chinese representation was' placed on the 
General Assembly agenda and was influenced by the entry of new states 
and changes in the international system. To counter this, the United 
States and her allies triggered a procedural manuever by passing the 
"important question" resolution. Thus, the United States was able to 
delay for a number of years the seating of the People's Republic of 
China. Most recently, the United States coupled the nimportant 
question" resolution with the two Chinas doctrine, hoping that the 
Republic of Cpina might retain a separate seat in the United Nations. 
It will be necessary to look into the problem from the United 
States perspective. The change in United States policy may be 
studied from the differing opinions of its allies, a study of the 
sponsors of a number of draft resolutions introduced before the 
General Assembly, and the multi-faceted views of the different member 
states representatives regarding the issue. The study will also deal 
with the problems faced in securing acceptance of the two Chinas 
policy and how and why the United States insisted on the two Chinas 
policy? 
Limited recognition of the People's Republic of'China outside of 
the Communist bloc and the alleged violations of the United Nations 
Charter by the People's Republic of China during the Korean War were 
the primary legal arguments put forth by the United States. Although 




question of Chinese representation was closely related to the 
question of recognition of the People's Republic of China. A United 
Nations Secretariat Memorandum of 1950 had rejected recognition policy 
as a criterion for United Nations action on the question of Chinese 
representation.7 During the period of the moratorium, the United 
States often equated the legitimacy of the Nationalist Government 
with the fact that most of the member states in the United Nations 
recognized the Nationalist Government. But with the growing member-
ship of the United Nations, the United States found it expedient to 
base its arguments on the question of Chinese representation in the 
United Nations, on the unlawful behavior of the People's Republic of 
China in the international community and her belligerent actions 
during the Korean War. And yet, the United States seemed to recog-
nize the~ facto situation of the People's Republic of China by the 
two Chinas doctrine. 
Method and Procedure 
Primary sources will be cited to a great extent in presenting a 
description of the policy pursued by the United States within the 
United Nations on the question of Chl,Ilese representation. These will 
include the official record of the proceedings of the United Nations 
General Assembly, as well as the publications of the Department of 
State. Such secondary studies as monographs and articles on the 
politics of Chinese representation in the United Nations will be con-
sulted to provide diverse insights on the course of American policy 
7Sheld~n Appleton, The Eternal Triangle (East Lansing: Michigan 
State University Press, 1961), p. 19. 
and that of other delegations. The files of the New York Times will 
also be extensively consulted for factual reporting to analyze the 
actions of the participants. 
Review of Literature 
Studies concerning the Chinese representation question have 
' 
touched lightly on the proceedings of the plenary sessions of the 
General Assembly. They have dealt more with the two chinas concept, 
and particularly, with the status of Taiwan. A comprehensive study 
8 is the work of Lung Chu-Chen and Harold D. Laswell. They have 
7 
examined the claims put forward by the United States, the Republic of 
China, and the People's Republic of China to influence the outcome 
in bloc politics in the United Nations. The authors have advocated 
an independent Taiwan as a solution. In other words, by focusing on 
Formosa in seeking a solution to China's participation in the 
United Nations, they offered a one-China and one-Formosa solution. 
In an article concerning the two Chinas concept, Paul M.A. 
Linebarger has written that the two Chinas policy "begins and ends in 
Washington D. c. as long as the Washington-Taipei connection remains 
firm. 119 The author has presented a view favoring the Nationalist 
Government. It is of interest to note that he considered Peking the 
loser since the role of the United States and the Soviet Union would 
be significant in the resolution of the problem. 
8 Lung Chu-Chen and Harold Laswell, Formosa, China, and the 
United Nations (New York, 1967). ~ ~ 
9Paul M.A. Linebarger, "The Two Chinas," Current History, 
XLVII, No. 277 (September 1964), P• 163. 
Sheldon Appleton's The Eternal Triangle presents a historical 
and analytical study ot the United States policy on the question of 
8 
Chinese representation. He examines the two claimants' status on the 
basis of a viable government, support from the people and the ability 
t t ' t t . 1 bl. t. lO o mee in erna iona o iga ions. 
What comes closer to this research is the work done by 
F. B. Schick~1 His study concerns the proceedings of the ~eventeenth 
session of the General Assembly. He points out how the debates have 
centered on the "admission" of the People's Republic of China while 
the whole matter concerns the "representation" of two claimant 
governments. Yet this article is now somehow outdated as it was 
written in 1963. 
10 Appleton. 
11F. B. Schick, "The Question of China in the United Nations," 
The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, XII, Part 4 
(October 1963). - -
CHAPTER II 
DEVEIDPMENT OF UWITED STATES CHINA POLICY 
Containment, Isolation, Non-Recognition 
and Moratorium 
After the Communist Government took over the ma.inland from the 
Nationalist Government, the United States regarded the People's 
Republic of China as a short-lived government. A policy 6f non-
commitment was enunciated by President Truman on January 5, 1950. 
He withheld recognition from the Government of the People's Republic 
of China, but did not support the Nationalist Governinent. According 
to President Truman, 
The United States has no predatory designs on Formosa 
or on any other Chinese territory. The United States has 
no desire to obtain special rights or privileges or to 
establish military bases on Formosa at this time. ·Nor does 
it have any intention of utilizing its armed forces to 
interfere in the present situation. The United States 
Government will not pUI'ijUe a course which1will lead to in-
volvement in the civil conflict in China. 
The United States postUI'e regarding the threat of dommunism in 
Asia after the Communist takeover in ma.inland China was expressed by 
Secretary of State Acheson in the same month. 
~~1'*' We are in~ere~ted in st~ping. the spread of communism 
· because commum.sm is a doctrine which we don't happen to 
like. Communism is the most subtle instrument of Soviet 
foreign policy ••• 
\arry Truman, "United States Policy Towards Formosa," Bulletin 
XX, No. 550 (January 16, 1950), p. 79. 
9 
Our real interest is in those people as people. It 
is because comnrunism is hostile to that interest that we 
want to stop it. But the best way of doing both things 
is to do just exactly what the peoples of Asi~ ~ant to do 
and what we want to help them to do which is to develop a 
soundness of administration in their new governments and 
to develop their resources and their technical skills so 
that they are not subject to penetration either through 
ignorance, or because they believe these false pr~mises, 
or because there is real distress in their areas. 
10 
Congress was divided over the China policy of President Truman, 
and early in 1950, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in~ 
vestigated State Department officials who had been charged by Senator 
Joseph McCarthy of communist activity or of being c5mmunist syrnpa-
' thizers. Through these investigations and through the activities of 
a nation-wide China Lobb~ the United States public opinion had come 
to believe that China had been sold out to the Communists. Professor 
Spanier explained this mood of the United States public when he 
wrote: 
••• The public did not comprehend the frustrations of 
American foreign policy in the Far East as compared to its 
victory in Europe. The assumption that the United States 
was omnipotent suggested the reason for America's politi-
cal and military failures: treason within our own 
government. 
211The Basic Position of the United States: Review of the 
Position as of 1950," Address by the Secretary of State, January 12, 
1950, Bulletin, XXII, No. 551 (January 23, 1950), pp. 111-118. 
3"China Lobby" is usually applied rather loosely to that dispa-
rate collection of organizations and individuals which in the 1940's 
and 1950's attempted to influence the United States Government and 
the American public in favor of supporting the Chinese Nationalists 
and opposing compromise with the Chinese Communists. A. T. Steele, 
The American People~ China (New York, 1966), p. 112. 
4John W. Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War II 
(New York, 1968), pp. 104-105. · ~ ~ 
11 
Professor A. T. Steele explained why such American interest in 
China was to be expected. He "Wrote, 
••• The long standing relationship between China.and the 
United States when the latter ma.de itself the "protector" 
of China from European powers by the Open Door Policy w~s 
viewed as though China was a ward of the United States. 
The domestic political situation and the Korean War caused a 
reversal of policy by President Truman. The new policy was one of 
containment coupled with continuing pressure on the Chinese Commu-
nist regime. 6 President Truman stated on June 27, 1950 that in view 
of North Korea's action, the occupation of Formosa by Communist 
forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area 
and to the United States forces. He ordered the United States Seventh 
Fleet to prevent any Communist attack on Formosa and to see that all 
Nationalist air and sea operations against the ma.inland were halted. 7 
When the Chinese Communists entered the Korean War in November 
1950, this was considered by the United States Government to repre-
sent a policy of expansion in Asia. To counter this, the United 
States added to the policy of containment the objective of isolating 
China from the rest of her Asian neighbors and the world. This was 
pursued in the United Nations to the fullest extent and in 1951 the 
United States pressured the General Assembly to declare the People's 
Republic of China the aggressor in Korea. 
5steele, P• 15. 
6A. Doak Barnett in Robert Blum, ed. , The United States and 
-China in World Affairs (New York, 1966), p. 136. -
7Henrietta Poynter, ed., China and United States Far East Policy 
1945-1966 (Washington D. c., 1967), P:-8. - -
• • .American diplomats were reportedly instructed to tell 
the governments to which tney wer? accredited· that American 
public opinion might shift sharply if the United Nations 
ignored the Chinese aggression and that the fate of the 
United Nations mi§ht hinge upon the action taken by the 
General Assembly. 
12 
The United States, in addition, guaranteed the security of Asian 
states by means of bilateral and military treaties and the Senate of 
the United States, on March 20, 1952, approved the four treaties which 
provided a foundation for security in the Pacific.9 
The Eisenhower administration cont:i..nued this policy of con-
tainment and isolation. Secretary of State Dulles gave priority to 
the policy of isolating China and protecting the Far East over the 
policy of protecting Europe against the threat of the Conurrunists. He 
explained his policy in the following ~tatement: 
We negotiated with the Governments of Britain, France, 
and other maritime powers for tightening of the blockade 
of Conurrunist China. They are taking important and practi-
cal measures to restrict the voyages of their own ships to 
China and to withhold fuel from ships of other nations 
which are carrying ·~trategic goods to China. 
You can see as others have seen that a new order of 
priority and urgency has been given to the Far East. 
Further, it has been made clear that we consider that our 
Eastern friends from Japan, Korea, and Formosa to Indo.-
china and Malaya face a single hostile front, to be met t 
with a common purpose and growing cooperation as between 
the component parts of freedom. 
This means that the Communists in the Far East can no 
longer count on winning by shifting their strength and by 
focusing attack on one or another free-world posit.:fori .. 
8Donald G. Bishop, The.Administration of United States Foreign 
Policy through the United Nations (Dobbs Ferry, New York, 1967), 
P• 65. 
9These four treaties are: Treaty of Peace with Japan,;Security 
Treaty between the United States and Japan, Mutual Iiefense'Treaty 
between the United States and the Philippines, and Se~urity Treaty 
between Australia, New Zealand, and the United Staies (ANZUS). 
that is isolated from the others. The Communist str&tegy 
based on a contiguous land mass, is now confronted by a 
growing free world unity based upon the peninsular · 
positions and offshorroisland chain now controlled by the 
free peoples of Asia. 
To further guarantee the secur±ty of Asian states, a defense 
chain was built around the periphery of the Asian mainland. The 
mutual security defense pact, signed by eight countries in September 
1954, formed the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), and in 
December of the same year, a mutual defense pact was 'signed by the 
United States Government and the Nationalist Chinese Government. 
The policy of isolation was also carried out a step further 
through trade and travel embargoes and diplomatic non-recognition. 
Arguments were advanced against the recognition of China by such 
leading statesmen as President Eisenhower, former President Hoover, 
Secretary of State John F. Dulles, former Ambassador Philip Jessup, 
13 
officials of the Department of State, fifty-six senators in a petition 
to the President, and spokesmen of the China Lobby. 
The reasons given why the United States .should withhold recog-
n~tion were: 1) non-recognition was part of a broader policy that 
included support for the Nationalist Government in Taiwan while 
anticipating the collapse of the Communist regime; 11 2) the Communist 
government had failed to fulfill its international obligations, such 
as the maltreatment of American consular officials and American 
lOJohn F. Dulles, "The First 90 Days," Bulletin, XXVIII, No. 722 
(April 27, 1953), P• 605. 
11 Joseph G. Whelan, "The United States and Diplomatic Recog-
nition: The Contrasting Cases of Russia and Communist Chira " The 
China Quarterly, No. 5 (January-March 1961), p. 219. ' -
14 
. 
prisoners of the Korean War; 3) Communist China's international 
behavior was deemed to be hostile to the United Nations and aggressive 
in that it was supporting violent revolutions to establish commu-
nism in other countries; and 4) recognition and acceptance of the 
Peking regime would have weakened the will of the Asian states to 
. t C . t. . 12 resis ommunis expansion. 
In applying the objective tests of international law, l3 we find 
there was no doubt that the Central People's Government exercised 
actual control and authority over its territory and commanded the 
support of its people. T. C. Chen points out that non-fulfilment of 
tre international obligations requirement has often been used as a 
pretext for withholding recognition whenever the wish of the recog-
nizing state is not fully complied with. 14 President Eisenhower on 
thispoint stated: 
We must remember that different nations have different 
interpretations on what recognition of a nation means. 
Ever since Wilson's time, we in this country have more or 
less gone on the theory that recognition also means tacit 
approval. At one time, recognition meant just recognition 
of the fact that there was a de facto ruler of an im-
portant segment of the world.~In certain countries, that 
viewpoint still holds. With us, because there has been a 
different meaning developed in this country on this 1grd 
"recognition," we have to view the case differently. 
12v1adimir Petrov,~ China Policy? (Hamden, Connecticut, 
1961), p. 11. 
l3For a comparative study of the affirmative and negative evi-
dences concerning the recognition of the Governlnent of the People's 
Republic of China see: J. Weston Walch, Complete Handbook~ Recog-
nition of Communist China (Portland, Maine, 1954). 
14Petrov, p. 8. 
1511The March of News," Q. S. News, No. 34 (May 22, 1953), P• 4. 
15 
The United States felt that recognition of the Government of the 
People's Republic of China would weaken American leadership and would 
jeopardize American commitments to Taiwan and the non-communist states. 
Mcconaughy says that recognition assumed a political and psychological 
signi~icance which meant in the eyes of millions, • :especia.ily in Asia, 
not necessarily approval but acceptance, accommodation and recon-
cilement.16 
The United States position on recognition is important because it 
explained in part the United States policy regarding the question of 
Chinese representation in the United Nations. The period from 1949 to 
1960 has been described as the period of the moratorium on the Chinese 
question at the United Nations. 
The Period of the Moratorium 
The issue of Chinese representation came about when the Govern-
ment of the People's Republic of China protested in 1949 that it was 
the rightful representative of China. The memorandum addressed to the 
Secretary-General called for the expulsion of the representatives of 
the Nationalist Goverrtment of the Republic of China in the United 
Nations. 
On March 8, 1950, United Nations Secretary-General Trygve Lie 
implied in a memorandum to all the delegations that the Communist 
16Richard Mcconaughy, Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs, 
~'China in the Shadow of Communism," U. S. The Department of State 
Publication .(Washington D. C., 1954), Far Eastern Series b3, p. 6. 
16 
Government should be permitted to take China's seat at the United 
Nations, 17 but Lie did not have his way. 
In the fifth session of the General Assembly, the discussion was 
primarily over which government was the legal representative of China, 
therefore, which delegationts credentials should be accepted? India 
stated that the Government of the People's Republic of China was the 
legitimate representative, while the United States argued that only 
sixteen member states out of fifty-nine had granted recognition to the 
People's Republic of China. Three draft resolutions were submitted to 
the General Assembly. The Indian and USSR draft resolutions to seat 
the representatives of the People's Republic of China were defeated; 
the Canadian resolution to establish a Special Committee to deal with 
the question won. 18 The President of the General Assembly thereupon 
selected the members of the Special Committee and asked them to report 
to the Assembly. The Soviet Union objected on the ground that out of 
seven members, only two recognized the Government of the People's 
Republic of China. The President replied that the basis for his 
selection was the proportion of member states in the United Nations 
which had recognized the People's Republic of China, namely one-third, 
and so in a committee of seven members, one-third corresponded to two 
members. 
The fifth session was also the scene of another· debate on China. 
17 Poynter, p. 51. 
1811Question of the Representation of China in the United Nations: 
Membership of the Special Committee," G.A:o:g Fifth Session, (305th 
Plenary Meeting), p. 391. · 
Cuba19 had placed on the agenda a draft resolution to establish an 
ad hoc political committee to deal with the ''Recognition by the 
United Nations of the Representation of a Member State." The repre-
sentatives of the Soviet Union cited this as another example by the 
United States to obstruct the admission of the People's Republic of 
China. 20 Members of the Communist bloc interpreted the Cuban action 
as an attempt to block the admission of the People's Republic of 
China, so the Polish delegate stated that while discussion in the 
committee purportedly considered the problem in the ab.stract, it was 
clear throughout the debates that China was the real issue. 
The Ad Hoc Political Committee report which was adopted as 
Resolution 396 (V) by the General Assembly on December 14, 1950, 
recommended that, 
Whenever more than one authority claims to be the 
Government entitled to represent a Member State in the 
United Nations and this question becomes the subhect of 
controversy in the Organization, the question should be 
considered in the light of the Purposes and Principles of 
the Charter and the circumstances of each case. The 
Assembly recommends that, when any such question arises, 
it should be considered by the General Assembly or bl1the 
Interim Committee if the Assembly is not in session. 
l9Cuba at that time did not have a.Communist government. 
17 
2011Recognition by the United Nations of the Representation of a 
Member State: Report of the ~ Hoc Pqlitical Committee (A/1578 and 
Addl) , " ~ Fifth Session, pp. t!f 5-676. · 
2111Recognition by the United Nations of the Representation of a 
Member State," United Nations Decisions of the Fifth and Sixth 
Sessions (New York, February25, 1952), SupplementNo:--3' to Back-
ground Paper No. 46, p. 15. A Sub-Committee of the Ad ~ Political. 
Committee which prepared the report was composed of the representatives 
of Australia, Belgium, China, Cuba, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, 
Egypt France India, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, . , ' 
Uruguay and Venezuela. 
The year 1950 did not produce any United Nations action to seat the 
People's Republic of China. 
From 1951 to 1960, the Chinese representation question was not 
placed on the agenda of the General Assembly. The issue was dis-
18 
cussed in the General Committee, while it was considering the agenda 
of the General Assembly, and also in the Credentials Committee. 22 
The General Committee kept recommending to the General Assembly the 
United States draft resolution to postpone the. discussion of the 
issue for the duration of each session. The Soviet Union and India 
kept countering this by submitting other draft resolutions and even 
tried to introduce amendments to the draft resolution of the 
General Committee but without success. 
For example, on November 13, 1951 the General Committee submitted 
to the General Assembly a draft resolution to postpone discussion of 
the isaue during the sixth session. The Soviet Union.blamed the 
Anglo-American bloc for preventing consideration of the issue, and 
those who supported the Soviet Union's draft resolution argued that a 
precedent had been set by General Assembly Resolution 396 (V) recom-
mending that the question of representation should be considered by 
the General Assembly or by the Interim Committee if the Assembly was 
not in session. 23 The United States argued that since the Soviet 
Union had continuously proposed the issue in fully nine:ty ·organs . 
22The General Committee of the General Assembly is composed of 
the President, seven Vice-Presidents, and the Chairmen of the eight 
committees. The General Committee is responsible for making the draft 
proposal for the agenda of the General Assembly sessions. 
2311Adoption of the Agenda," GAOR Sixth Session, November 6, 1951-
February 5, 1952 (342nd Meeting, November 13, 1951), pp. 100-101. 
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of the United Nations, no useful purpose would be served by continuing 
the debate. The General Committee's reconunendation was adopted by 
thirty-seven votes to eleven with four abstentions. The USSR draft 
resolution was not voted upon as the Conunittee's resolution was 
contrary to it. Naturally, this meant that the Chinese question was 
·not placed on the agenda. 
Interpretations of the rules and procedures of the General 
Assembly have often been the source of conflict on : h'.ow to vote on 
the:; draft Ch~ resolutions. In the ·eight session of the General 
Assembly, President Lester Pearson ma.de a ruling based on.Rule 91 
which states that if two or more proposals relate to the same 
question, the General Assembly shall, unless it deci~es otherwise, 
vote on the proposals in the order in whit:li they have been sub-
mitted. 44 Since both the United States and USSR draft resolutions 
dealt with the question of Chinese representation, the United States 
draft resolution was given priority, being submitted first and voted 
first. It was adopted by forty votes to eight w:ith eight abstentions. 
When the President placed the USSR draft resolution to a vote, the 
United States delegate appealed the ruling of the President. The 
United States appeal was voted on and was rejected. The USSR pro-
posal was then ready to be voted on. Great Britain, thereupon, asked 
for a recount of the votes on the United States appeal and the Soviet 
Union delegate stated that the British action was a 'political move 
and a lack of confidence in the President. Turkey joined.in to ask 
24"Question of Representation of China," GA.OR Eight Session, 
September 15- December 9, 1953 (432nd Plenary Meeting, September 15, 
1953), P• 10. . 
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why a vote was needed on the Russian proposal when the United States 
proposal already had been carried. The President replied that such 
an illogical step had been establ~shed in the first session of the 
General Assembly which established the habit of voting on proposals 
after a contrary proposal had been adopted. Finally, the President 
accepted T~iland's proposal that voting be on the basis of the 
second sentence of rule 91, stating that the General Assembly may 
after each vote on a proposal decide whether to vote on the next 
proposal. 25 The President asked the Assembly whether to vote or not to 
vote on the Russian proposal, and the Assembly voted not to vote on 
the Russian proposal. In all succeeding sessions of the General 
Assembly, the United States proposal always had priority in voting 
since it was part of the General Committee's recommendation which was 
submitted first. 
Several countries criticized the General Committee's recontr-
mendation on the floor ~f the General Assembly. India and Nepal said 
that the Committee had acted ultra vires its own power, and pointed 
out that its recommendation cannot be final, and that it was the 
General Assembly which should make the decision. 26 They pointed out 
that the Committee's action was in fact contrary to the Charter and 
the previous decisions of the General Assembly, namely Resolution 396 
25Ibid., p. 12. 
26Functions of the General Committee are basically those of 
making recommendations concerning the inclusion of items in the agenda, 
the rejection of requests for inclusion or the inclusion of item in 
the provisional agenda of future session. GAOR Eleventh Session, 
November 12, 1956-March 8, 1957 (578tp Plenary Meeting, November 15, 
1956), P• 59. 
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(V), which was adopted in 1950. The United States countered by 
saying that there was no need to discuss further the procedural 
matter, and that "The General Committee's report should be upheld, as 
a substantial majority of the General Committee approved it by a 
substantial vote."27 Others have pointed out that the General Com-
mittee was precipitating action that would affect the work of the 
Credentials Committee. 28 This is.because the report of the Cre-
dentials Committee was usually considered by the General Assembly on 
the closing date or, in any case, on one of the last days of the 
session, that is, after consideratj_pn of the General Committee's 
recommendation; 29 which meant that action on the General Committee's 
report wou.J.dhave affected the decision' of the General Assembly when,-
ever it examined the report of the Credentials Committee. 
The United States thus used the General Committee's report in a 
procedural manuever to stop the General Assembly from considering 
the Chinese question. The use of the General Committeetwhich deals 
with procedural matter~ to influence a political decision is explained 
by Patricia Ann Peyton who wrote: 
The General Committee's importance paradox:i,cally, is 
political. Procedural matters can become very important 
27"Adoption of the Agenda," GAOR Thirteenth Session, September 16-
December 13, 1958 (753rd Plenary Meeting, September 22, 1958), p. 66. 
28The Credentials Committee's function is to examine the cre-
dentials of the representatives of member states of the United Nations. 
29s. E. Werners, The Presidtj.ng Officers in the United Nati~ 
(Haarlem, 1967), P• 69. 
politically. Each country desires to protect its special 
interests which could be harmed through inclusion on the 
agenda; if a detrimental item is included, there is still 
opportunity for countries to protect their political 
interests by changing the wording of the item, or by 
grouping it with others to diminish its importance, or 
emphasizing the most favorable ~J>ect of the question by 
allocating it t.o3e Committee which will v.iew it from a 
favorable angle. 
In the Credentials Committee, India and the Soviet Union kept 
askirig regularly; for the invalidation of the credentials -of the 
Government. of the Republic of China. In 1952 the Credentials Com-
mittee discussed a USSR and Byelorussian SSR's draft resolution to 
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declare invalid the credentials of the Nationalist Government dele-
gation.31 The United States argued t1'at Communist China could-not be 
admitted pecause it was found guilty of aggression in Korea. The 
United States motion not to vote on the USSR draft resolution was 
sustained, and the report of the Credentials Committee was adopted.32 
When the report went before the General Assembly, the Assembly 
~locked the discussion of the question despite the Soviet Union's 
repeated endeavors to raise it again, refusing to let the ·soviet Union 
explain why it voted "yes" on the Byelorussian SSR' s draft resolution 
before the Credentials Committee. 
30Patricia Ann Peyton, "The Evolution and Importance of the 
General Committee of the United Nations' General Assembly" ( unpub. 
master's thesis, Purdue University, 1963), p. 156. 
3l"Report of the Credentials Committee,'' GAOR Sixth Session 
(351st Plenary Meeting, December 7, 1951), p. 212:' 
32"Report of the Credentials Committee,"· GAOR Seventh Session, 
October 14, 1952-August 28, 1953 (389th Plenary°"Meeting, October 25, 
1952), PP• 167-168. 
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The moratorium policy of the United States does not mean there 
were absolutely no discussions of the Chinese representation question 
in the General Assembly's plenary session~. Actually, discussions of 
the problem of representation took place while the General Committee's 
report was being considered, that is, before the agenda was approved. 
I 
Arguments during the said General Assembly's plenary sessions 
linked the question of Chinese representation with~ facto control, 
recognition, legality through democratic elections, the admission of 
states based on universality versus states working for peace and are 
peace-loving, and the realistic need to have the People's Republic of 
China in the United Nations. Due to the extensive arguments posited 
by different delegations, this paper will give the views on the basis 
of the arguments of the delegates of the pro group, those who favored 
the seating of the People's Republic of China, and the delegates of 
the anti group, those against the seating. 
The problem of de facto control and whether a state is or is not 
peace-loving kept coming up as a basis for the discussion of the 
problem despite the Lie Memorandum of 1950. Walter Robertson, United 
States Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, gave the follow-
ing reasons in 1954 why the United States was opposed to the seating 
of Communist China. 
The United Nations is not an organization of de facto 
governments. It is an organization of nations which under 
the United Nations Charter have renounced war as an instru-
ment of national policy and have pledged themselves to take 
collective action to oppose aggression and preserve peace. 
Red China has flagrantly violated the inte5~tional 
obligations assumed by responsible governments. 
33walter S. Robertson, "Communist Tactics in the Far East," 
Bulletin XXXIII, No. 791 (August 23, 1954), P• 262. 
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The United States and her allies maintained that they recog-
nized the Nationalist Government as the de jure government of China, 
and pointed out that they considered the Nationalist Government to be 
, the representative of the Chinese people. Robertson had this to say 
about the United States position: 
It is true that the Peiping regime does now exercise 
physical control over a larger area of Chinese territory 
than that under the control of th~ Republic of China. 
However, this situation represent~ a military rather than 
a political reality. The Republic of China has repeatedly 
stated its willingness to rest its claim to represent the 
Chinese people on the basis of fre~ elections held through-
out the country. The Conununist military dictatorship o;4 
Peiping does not dare to submit its claim to such test. 
The pro group criticized the Uni'ted States for applying the cri-
teria of ~ jure control, recognition;, and legality through demo-
cratic elections, and claimed that the United States' bias against 
the political system of the People's Republic of China was the major 
reason for the United States opposition. According to the pro group, 
the People's Republic of China had been recognized by thirty-three 
states, was exercising authority over the entire mainland, was edu-
eating the people, and was fostering peaceful coexistence as declared 
in the Bandung Conference of 1954. Czechoslovakia said that the 
denial of China's legitimate right to recpgnition was a typical con-
sequence of the appearance of a "cold war" in the organization. 35 
... .:..._. 
34walter s. Robertson, "United States Position Ber"ore the United 
Nations General Assembly, September 21, 1959," American Foreign Policy 
Current Documents, 1959, p. 13, 
3·5"Aq.aption of the Agenda," GAOR Fourteenth Session, September 15 
December 13, 1959 (80oth Plenary Meeting, September 21, 1959), p. 64. 
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The pro group added that the criteria to be applied in the 
question of representation should be the principles of universality 
and political reality. To this the United States replied that the 
principle of universality in membership was not applicable and that 
the United Nations was not engaged in promoting realism. According 
to the United States delegate, 
• • • This hall is not a mere cockpit in which the criminals 
and the law-abiding are indiscriminately scrambled. The 
United·Nations ,garter says that Member States should be 
"peace-loving." 
The pro gro.up replied that the People's Republic of china had made 
valuable contributions to the Korean War negotiations and the Geneva 
Conference on Indochina, and that these were signs of her adherence 
to peace. The USSR argued that the .failure to seat the People's 
.. 
Republic of China was contrary to the Charter of the United Nations 
and did not serve .. to, strentheneit,her international security .or 
world peace. Ceylon stressed the need to seat the People's Republic 
of China, and said that with the Chinese in the United Nations, 
crucial matters such as the test ban treaty could be discussed. 
Ceylon further gave the example of the settlement of the 1956 Middle 
East Crisis which was worked out through negotiations made possible 
by the United Nations.37 
3611Adoption of the Agenda," GAOR Twelfth Session, September 17-
December 14, 1957 (684th Plenary Meeting, September 23, 1957), 
P• 128. 
3711Adoption of the Agenda," GAOR Thirteenth Session ( 7 54th 
Plenary Meeting, September 23, 1958J"':° p. 85. - -
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The world crises were used by the anti group as pretexts for 
bloGking the placing of the issue on the agenda. In 1951 and 1956, 
the United States reconunended the adoption of the General Conunittee's 
report "due to the prevailing crises in Korea and in the Middle 
East." In 1951 Burma replied that· the.most potent arguement:· presented 
in support of the General Conunittee's reconunendation was the 
situation ,in Korea, yet the crisis would not have occurred had the 
representative of the People's Republic of China been seated.38 In 
1956 India asked why the United Kingdom and France, who are members 
of the Security Council, were not denounced for aggression against 
Egypt, the way the People's Republic of China was denounced as an 
aggressor in the Korean War. 
Other incidents,e.g., the Hungarian Crisis, the Quemoy and off-
shore islands crises and even the Congo Crisis were used to block 
any deliberation of the Chinese representation question. Ireland 
stated that the situation in Hungary did not warrant the deliberation 
of the issue, while others drew comparisons between events in 
Hungary and Conununist China.39 Canada declared that the Quemoy and 
offshore islands crises were manifestations of the aggressive nature 
of the People's Republic of China, and thus, the inclusion of the 
issue was untimely. Bulgaria ridicul'9d the claim that Chinese 
representation in the General Ass~mbly would create an unpropitious 
3B"Adoption of the Agenda: Report of the General Conunittee," 
GAOR Sixth Session (342nd Plenary Meeting, November 13, 1951), p. 101. 
39"Adoption of the Agenda, GAOR Eleventh Session, ( 57Bth Plenary 
Meeting, :t;Jo~ber 1'5"', 195·6), p.~ · · 
atmosphere for the Warsaw talks between the United States an~ the 
Ped~le's Republic of China regarding Formosa and the offshore 
islands.4° 
The United States in 1960 presented a new argument when it 
charged that the attitude of the Chinese Communists in African 
matters was "entirely" aggressive and warlike. It circulated as a 
United Nations document a statement ma.de by the Mayor of Peking; 
Mr. Peng Chen, and argued that the statement clearly showed the 
hostility of the Peking regime and Peking's propaganda campaign 
against the United States. This was the part of the statement to 
which the United States took strong objection: 
27 
••• The recent armed intervention of the United States 
imperialism in the Congo under the cover of the United 
Nations flag has disclosed most nakedly that the United 
States imperialism is the mo~1 vicious enemy of nationa-
list independence in Africa. ~ 
Guinea replied that the People's Republic of China was not a 
threat to the African states and pointed out that the People's 
Republic of China had the backing of the African states. Guinea 
further '.noted that a resolution calling for the restoration of the 
rights of the People's Republic of China had been adopted by the 
Afro-Asian Conference in April 1960.42 Ghana stated that the African 
struggle for independence against colonialism was a nationalist 
40"Agenda Item 9," GAOR ThirJ,eenth Session ( 7 49th Plenary 
Meeting, September 18, 1958), p. 71. 
4l"Adoption of the Agenda," GAOR Fifteenth Session, I, Part 1 
(881st Plenary Meeting, October 1~60), p. 305:--- ~ 
42Ibid. 
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movement; yet the West was claiming it was communist and that African 
leaders such as Lumumba were branded as communist agents. 43 
On a number of occasions during the General Assembly's plenary 
sessions, the pro group pointed out that the moratorium policy would 
eventually lead to a two Chinas policy. In the debate of 1960, the 
pro group accused the anti group of propagating a two Chinas concept. 
The United States delegate denied this, stating that: "The issue is 
not two or one China[~] but the behavior of the China which seeks 
admission."44 
The arguments by the pro and anti groups thus often dealt with 
the substantial aspects of the problem, with the p-ro group always 
insisting on placing the Chinese representation question on the 
agenda. Most of the speakers belonged to the pro group, and they 
felt that the General Committee recommendation was an act of in-
justice to the People's Republic of China. One way to gauge the 
strength of the positions of the pro and anti groups is to study the 
arguments used. Another way is to show the number of member states 
supporting the United States and how many were for the People's 
Republic of China. The pattern of voting in the General Assembly 
reveals this. 
Patterns of Voting 
By using the bloc system of voting, it can be seen which bloc 
supported the moratorium policy of the United States. It does not 
43Ibid., P• 362. 
44Ibid., (891st Plenary Meeting, October 6, 1960), p. 545. 
29 
mea~ that all of them voted the same way everytime; in fact, only the 
Soviet bloc is considered to be a true bloc in this sense.45 The 
following table of votes for the years 1950-1960 shows which countries 
voted for or against the moratorium.46 
45A bloc is a group of states which meet· regularly in caucus, 
and the members of which are bound in their votes in the General 
Assembly caucus decision. Thomas Hovet Jr., Bloc Politics in the 
United Nations (Cambridge, 1960), pp. 30-31. ~ ~ ~ 
46 ) A. M. Halpern, ed., Policies Toward China (New York, 1965, 
TAB:c;;: I 
UNITED NATIONS VOTE;S REIATED ro·· TIIE CHINA QUESTION, 1950-6oa 
1950 1951 1951b 1952 195l· 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 
seat aggr mora mora mora mora rnora mora mora mora mora mora 
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( 1) 1950 - a resolution to oust the representatives of the Republic of China and to seat the 
People's Republic of China, 
(2) 1951 - a resolution to condemn the Pf;lople's Republic of China as an "aggressor" in Korea 
and a resolution to p<>stpone discussion the representation question ( a moratorium 
resol.ution). 
(3) 1952-1960 - moratorium resolutions similar to that of 1951, 
The dates refer to tp.e year in which the vote occurred, not necessarily to the year in which the 
Assembly was convened, 
bThe 1951 and 1953 moratorium votes were not roll-call votes, so only totals are available for 
these two years. 




































TABLE I (Cont.inued) 
1950 1951 1951b 1952 19531> 1954 1955 1956 1957 . 1958 1959 1960 
seat aggr mora mora mora mora IDOr!l mora mora mora mora mora 
56. Iran x x x x x x x x x 
57. Iraq x x x x x x 
58. Turkey " x ·x x x x x x x 59. Lebanon a x x " x x x x x x 60. SaudidArabia a a a a a a a a a a 
61. Syria a a a a a 
62. UAR (Egyptl a a x a a 
63. Yemen · a a a a a 
64. Jordan a x x x x 
65. Lil;)ya a x a a a 
66. Tunisia a a a a a-
67. Morroco x 
68. Ethiopia x x x x x x x a 
69. Liberia x x x· x x x x x x 
70. Sudan 
71. G\linea 
72. Camerollll a 
73. Central African Republic a 
74. Chad a 
75. Congo ~Brazaville' a 
76. Congo Leopoldville) nv 
77. Dahomey a 
78. Gabon a 
79. Ivory Coast a 
80. Malagasy a 
81. Mali 
82. Niger a 
83. Senegal 
84. Somalia a 
85. Togo a 
86. Upper Volta a 
COIH>NWEALTH BIOC 
87, Canada a x x x x x x x x x 
88. Australia x x x x x x x x x 
89. New Zealand x x x x x x x x x 
90. Federation of Malaya x x x a 
91. India x a 
92. Pakistan x a a x x x x x x x 
93. Ceylon 
94· Cyprus a 
95. Ghana 
96. Nigeria 
97. South Africa x x x x x nv x x x 
~~~- ~~~e~T!~esc x x x x x x x x x 
99. Republic of China x x x x x x x x x 
· 100. Israel x x a x a a a a a a 
TABLE TOTALS 
1950 1951 195lb 1952 1953b 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 
seat aggr mora mora mora mora mora mora mora mora mora mora 
For 16 44 37 42 44 43 42 47 48 44 44 42 
Against 33 7 11 7 10 11 12 24 27 28 29 34 
Abstain 10 9 4 li 2 6 6 8 6 9 9 22 
Not Vot:i,ng 0 0 8 0 4 0 0 0 l 0 0 
TOTAL MEM!3ERSHIP 59 60 6o 6o 60 bO 60 79 82 81 82 99 
din 1958 E~ and Syria formed the United Arab Republic, and Syria gave ~ her seat in the General 
Assembly. t union was dissolved in 1961. Syria then returned to the Assembly as an independent 
country, but Egypt retained the name "United Arab Republic" for l,tself. 
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We can see that the Soviet bloc continuously voted against the 
moratorium resolution. The Latin-American bloc regularly voted with 
the United States, except for Ctil;>a, which underwent a change of 
government in 1959, and abstained from voting in 1959 and 1960. 
The Western European bloc was divided. States voting con~ 
sistently with the United States were the United Kingdom, France, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Greece, Luxembourg, Italy, and Spain. Sweden 
started to vote against the moratorium in 1952, while Denmark and 
Norway voted against it in 1954. Ireland voted for the moratorium 
until 1956 but changed in 1957. Austria voted in favor of the mora-
torium in 1956 and 1957 but abstained thereafter while Portugal 
continuously abstained fro~ voting. Yugoslavia and.Finland continu-
ously voted against the moratorium resolution, 
The Afro-Asian bloc countries belonging to the Southeast Asia 
Treaty Organization, those which had bilateral treaties with the 
United States like Japan, the Philippines, and Thailand, and some 
countries in the Middle East like Turkey, Iran, and Lebanon, as well 
as Liberia and South Africa, all voted consistently with the United 
States. 
Of the Commonwealth bloc states, the United Kingdom, Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand, Malaya, and South Africa voted consistently 
for the United States resolution. Pakistan supported the United 
States except for one abstention in 1952, while India and Ceylon voted 
against the moratorium. 
Non-bloc states such as the , Republic of China and the United 
States voted consistently for the moratorium resolution. Israel's 
voting record shows support for the moratorium and a number of 
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abstentions. 
The table totals show that from 1956 the votes against the mora-
torium began to increase while there was little change in favor of 
the moratorium. This was due to the growing United Nations member-
ship from seventy-nine in 1956 to ninety-nine in 1960. The voting in 
1960 on the report of the General Committee showed that while the 
report was accepted, it failed to win a majority for the first time. 
More countries voted against it, abstained or did not vote. This was 
a signal for the United States to use a new strategy in the Unite<;!. 
Nations. The new African countries seem to have been responsible 
for this: 
••• There was a significant development with respect to the 
attitudes of the new United Nations members, mostly African 
countries. Thirteen aR,tained while three voted against the 
moratorium resolution. 
4711Chinese Representation in the United Nations," United States 
Participation in ~ United Nations: Report El the President !2 the 
Congress for !h.2 Year 1960 (Washington D. C., 1961), Department of 
State Publication 7341, International Organization and Conference 
Series 27, p. 100. 
CHAPI'ER III 
A REAPPRAISAL OF UNITED STATES POLICY 
Frt>m a Policy of Containment and 
Isolation to Rapprochement 
The policy to exclude the People's Republic of China from the 
United Nations was pursued by the United States from 1961 to 1970 in a 
new form. The General Assembly voting turn-out in 1960 as reported in 
the previous chapter, and the differences in opinion between the 
United States and her allies led the United States to abandon the 
moratorium policy and adopt the "important question" policy in the 
United Nations. 
The growing membership of third world countries in the United 
Nations necessitated the application, by the end of the fifties, of 
more pressure on member states by the United States in order to main-
tain its position in the sixties. Other signs of the growing 
influence of the third world bloc were the ideological split in the 
Siner-Soviet camp, the United Nationslcrises resulting from peace-
keeping operations in different parts of the world, particularly its 
handling of the problems of colonialism and disarmament, and finally, 
the appointment of U Thant, who came from a neutral third world 
country, to succeed Dag Hammarskjold as Secretary-General of the 
United Nations. 
In this United Nations atmosphere, the United States launched its 
"important question" policy and maintained it for a decade within the 
3h 
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councils of the United Nations, while outside the United Nations, in 
Warsaw, the United States was negotiating with the Peoplels Republic 
of China. Trade and travel restrictions were relaxed, and American 
antipathy toward the Peoplels Republic of China became more restrained 
compared to the previous decade; yet, the United States posture against 
the seating of the Peoplels Republic of China did not change. This 
policy of exclusion of China continued during the Kennedy, Johnson 
and the first part of the Nixon administrations. 
In 1961, the United States for the first time succeeded in 
mustering support at the United Nations for a resolution that declared 
the representation of China to be an "important question" requiring a 
two-thirds majority vote of the General Assembly. The United States 
did not submit similar resolutions in 1962 and 1963, and the voting 
was confined to resolutions to seat the Peoplels Republic of China, 
one submitted by the USSR in 1962 and the other by Albania in 1963, 
and both were defeated. 
Fears of an expansionist China and of its extremist form of 
communism continued in those years to influence United States policy 
toward the Peoplels Republic of China. Two United States Department 
of State officers explained this position. In a speech in 1963 before 
the Commonwealth Club, Assistant Secretary of State for Far· Eastern 
Affairs Roger Hilsman stated: 
••• Faced with the realities of the nuclear age, the Soviet 
Union appears to recognize that certain interests--notably 
survival--are shared by all mankind. Peiping, however, 
remains wedded to a fundamentalist form of communism, even 
if it threatens the physical ruin of the civilized world. 
It refuses to admit that there are common interests which 
cross ideological lines. 
United States policy is influenced by Chinese 
obsessive suspicion of the outside world, far exceeding that 
of the Soviet Union. 1 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Far Eastern Affairs Marshall Green, who 
addressed a Princeton University Conference on February 26, 1965,said, 
We avoid those actions which would tend to strengthen 
Communist China's position or contribute to the realization 
of its expansionist goals. Thus, we refuse to establish 
diplomatic relations w~th China or to promote its seating 
in the United Nations. 
There was no discussion of the Chinese representation question in 
1964 di.ie to a financial crisis in the United Nations. In 1965 the 
United States submitted a draft resolution reaffirming the validity of 
the 1961 "important question'' resolution. Albania responded by sub-. 
mitting a draft resolution to seat the People's Republic of China. 
The "important question" resolution got fifty-six votes to forty-nine 
with eleven abstentions, while the Albanian resolution received forty-
seven votes to forty-seven with twenty abstentions. 
The vote on the Albanian resolution might have prompted Congress 
to review the United States stand on the Chinese representation 
question. In 1966 two congressional subcommittees were formed, one 
was chaired by Senator Fulbright of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee and the other by Representative Zablocki of the Subcommittee 
on the Far East and the Pacific of the House Foreign Affairs Com-
mittee.3 It was clear from the hearings that the possibility of the 
1Roger Hilsman, "Clarification ••• of the Policies which We are 
Adopting Toward the Soviet Union and Toward Communist China," 
American Foreign Policy Current Documents (December 13, 1963), p. 759. 
2Mar~hall Green, "Communist China as a Problem in United States 
Policy-MaKing," Bulletin, LII, No. 1344 (March 29, 1965), P• 451. 
3Ruth B. Russell, The United Nations and United States Security 
Policy (Washington D. c:-;-1968), p. 377. ~ 
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United Nations admitting the People's Republic of China was becoming 
real, and leading Sinologists who spoke at these congressional 
hearings were practically unanimous on the need to adopt a two Chinas 
policy in the United Nations, allowing for the representation of both 
the Nationalist and the Commmunist governments. Professor A. Doak 
Barnett advocated the seating of the People's Republic of China on 
condition that the United States should also obtain representation for 
the Taipei regime; Professor John A. Fairbanks agreed that Communist 
China be seated in the United Nations despite its disruptive nature; 
Professor John M. H. Lindbeck suggested that normal relations be 
established with mainland China; and Professor Donald Zagoria, while 
expressing himself against United States support for the entry of 
Communist China, called upon the United States to stop opposing China 
because a majority of the countries in the United Nations wanted to 
seat both governments. 4 However, ex-Congressman Walter Judd and 
Professor Donald N. Rowe were of the opinion that the isolation of Red 
China was a realistic policy and that the policy of accommodation 
should require the People's Republic of China to change its policy. 5 
These hearings seem to have had a minimal effect on United States 
policy in the United Nations because the United States continued to 
press the "important question" policy. The only noticeable change 
was the greater emphasis given to maintaining Taiwan's rights and 
preventing its expulsion from the United Nations. 
4Akira Iriye, ed., United States Policy Toward China (Boston, 
1968), PP• 170-176. 
5Ibid., pp. 181-184. 
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Although the United States posture on the China question did not 
change, signs of rapprochement with the People's Republic of China 
were noticeable. President Johnson had this to say in the 1967 
"State of the Union" message, 
We shall continue to hope for a reconciliation between 
the people of mainland China and the world community~ 
including working together in all the tasks of arms control, 
security and program on which the fate of the Chinese 
people, like their fellow men elsewhere, depends. 
We would be the first to welcome a China which decided 
to respect her neighbors' right. We would be the first to 
applaud her were she to apply her great energies and 
intelligence to improving the welfare of her people and we 
have no intention to deny her legitimate needs for secgrity 
and friendly relations with her neighboring countries. 
The People's Republic of China was negative in its response to 
the American diplomatic initiatives. Its numerous postponements of 
the Warsaw talks were interpreted to mean that China was isolating 
itself from the world. Undersecretary Katzenbach had this to say 
about China's response: 
••• Once again it is not the attitude of the United States 
.but that of the People's Republic of China which isolates. 
The United States, influential though it may be, does not 
control and govern the orga~s of the United Nations or of 
other international bodies. 
The Nixon administration embarked upon unilateral steps to 
improve United States relations with the People's Republic of China 
and to draw it into more consultations and negotiations. In 1969, 
Secretary of State William Rogers stated, 
61yndon B. Johnson, "The State of the Union," (Excerpts), 
Bulletin, LVI, No. 1440 (January 30, 1967), p. 162. 
7 "A Realistic View of Communist China," by Undersecretary 
Katzenbach, Bulletin, LVIII,~No. 1511 (June 10, 1968), p. 739. 
••• we shall take initiatives to reestablish more normal 
relations with Communist China and we shall remain 
responsive to n~ indications of less hostile attitudes 
from their side. 
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At a news conference with Secretary Rogers, someone asked whether the 
relaxation of trade restrictions would lead to a change in American 
views toward Peking's membership in the United Nations. The Secretary 
answered in the negative and said that such action would depend on 
future events. He also added, 
The steps that we have taken are quite consistent with 
the policy that we have announced; and that is, that we 
would like to improve our relations with Communist China. 
We think the way to do it is by small steps, and we have 
taken now two unilateral steps which we think are good. We 
are encouraged by the fact that--although we haven't had 
any affirmative response from Peking, there is a possi-
bility that these9[warsaw] talks in the ambassadorial 
level may resume. 
The Warsaw talks did not break the deadlock and the United States 
stand on the Chinese representation question did not change until 1971. 
The following discusssion of the "important question" policy is in-
tended to show what delaying tactics the United States used to keep 
the People's Republic of China out of the United Nations. 
The "Important Question" Policy 
The issue of Chinese representation was finally placed on the 
General Assembly agenda in 1961, and lengthy and heated debates became 
the yearly rule in the plenary sessions, except for the year 1964 when 
no discussions took place because the United Nations was in the grip 
\u1iam Rogers, "Vietnam in the Perspective of Ea.st Asia," 
Bulletin, LX, No. 1559 (May 12, 1969), P• 399. 
911secretary Rogers' News Conference of December 23, 1969," 
Bulletin, LXII, No. 1594 (January 12, 1970), P• 722. 
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of a financial crisis. 
In the yearly plenary sessions, the arguments ranged from the 
discusssion of the "important question" resolution, the two Chinas 
concept, the principle of universality, and finally, how realism 
dictated the seating of the· representatives of the People's Republic 
of China. 
The draft resolutions presented during this period were the 
United States' "important question," a draft resolution 'to seat the 
People's Republic of China (in 1963, it became the Albanian reso-
lution), and a draft resolution to establish a study committee on the 
problems of Chinese representation. This last draft resolution was 
intended as a compromise solution, somewhere between the "important 
question" and Albanian resolutions, and was abandoned in 1969 due to 
the lack of support from the member states. 
The relative strength of each group can be judged from the argu-
ments used, the voting turn-out, and the number of co-sponsors of 
each draft resolution. This is why this thesis will now deal with 
the arguments, followed by voting and sponsorship tables. 
In the sixteenth session of the General Assembly (1961), the New 
ZealandlO and the USSR delegations11 submitted separate proposals to 
the General Committee requesting that the issue of Chinese repre-
sentation be placed on the General Assembly's agenda. On 
lONew Zealand's request entitled, "Question of the Representation 
of China in the United Nations," (A/4874). 
11 USSR' s request entitled, "Restoration of the Lawful Rights of 
the People's Republic of China in the United Nations," (A/487 4). 
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September 25, 1961, the General Committee's recommendation to consider 
both proposals was approved by the General Assembly; thereupon, two 
draft resolutions were submitted: the USSR draft resolution12 
together with a three power amendment13 submitted by Cambodia, Ceylon, 
and Indonesia, and the Five Power draft resolution14 sponsored by the 
United States and her allies seeking to apply the "important question" 
procedure. 
In his speech before the General Assembly, United States repre-
sentative Stevenson underlined what he called four principal reasons 
of overriding importance which were to be considered by the General 
Assembly, 
First, the step [seat the People's Republic of China] 
advocated, once taken, is irreversible. 
Second, there are ample grounds to suspect that ••• 
the Peking regime ••• would be encouraged by its success 
in gaining admission to exert ••• a most disruptive and 
demoralizing influence on the Organization at this 
critical moment in its history. 
Thirdly, its admission ••• could seriously shake 
public confidence in the United Nations~I can assure you 
it would do so among the people of the United States--and 
this alone would significantly weaken the Organization. 
12That the General Assembly would resolve to remove from all 
United Nations organs, the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek clique 
and invite the representatives of the People's Republ'ic of China to 
send its representatives. For text of resolution, see Appendix A. 
l3Amendment that the representatives of the People's Republic of 
China be seated in the United Nations and all its organs. For text 
of amendment, see Appendix A. 
14rhat the Assembly would decide in accordance with Article 18 
of the Charter that any prop:osal to change the representation of 
China was an important question ( i. e. , requiring a two-thirds 
majority vote for adoption). For text of resolution, see Appendix B. 
Fourth, ••• the explicit conditions which the Chinese 
Communists themselves demand to be fulfilled before they 
will deign to accept a seat in the United Nations, ••• the 
expulsion of the Republic of Chin1f5and restoration of her 
legitimate rights are impossible. · 
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The United States statement was a warning to member states of 
disaster if and when the representatives of the People's Republic of 
China were allowed to take China's seat. This also made the United 
States sponsor the "important question" resolution because the United 
States considered the expulsion of the representatives of the: 
Republic of China to be unrealistic. 
The 1961 debate seems to have centered on the two-thirds 
majority requirement, Australia pointed out that the problem was of 
such magnitude that it could not be solved by a simple majority. 
Senegal pointed out that the problem had to be linked to Article 18 
(2) of the Charter requiring a two-thirds majority vote. Great 
Britain stated that a two-thirds majority was needed in order to 
reach a solution acceptable to a wide majority of the member states 
and fair to the countries concerned. The French and Cameroun dele-
gates argued that the question was important becaµse it involved 
changing the representation of China, and because the question had · 
been raised for twelve years. 16 
The USSR insisted that the problem was nothing more than a 
question of credentials and Poland added that there was no require-
1511Question of the Representation of China in the United 
Nations. Restoration of the Lawful Rights of the People's Republic 
of China in the United Nations," GAOR Sixteenth Session, October 19-
, pecember 15, 1961, II (1069th Plenary Meeting, December 1, 1961), 
p. 905. 
16Yearbook ~ the United Nations (New York, 1961), pp. 126-127. 
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ment of a two-thirds majority to recognize the credentials of a dele-
gation.17 Ceylon stated that the two-thirds majority was another 
procedural obstruction to the General Assembly's action in considering 
the credentials of the People's Republic of China. ·· To the Soviet 
bloc, the two-thirds majority requirement was actually a plan to 
18 impose the two Chinas concept. 
When the votes were taken, the Five-Power resolution won over the 
USSR resolution and it became the "important question" (Resolution 
1668 (XVI)) which was re-adopted continuously by the General Assembly 
from 1961 to 1970 except for the years 1962, 1963, arid 1964, as was 
explained earlier. 
When the "important question" resolution was re-introduced in 
1965, the Philippine delegate supported the "important question" claim 
and reiterated the 1961 arguments of the French and Cameroun dele- . 
gates. 19 The Romanian delegate argued, 
••• To claim that this question must be resolved by a two-
thirds majority, when the situation has been created and 
maintained as a result of a decision adopted by a simple 20 
majority, suffices to violate the United Nations Charter. 
The United States and her allies were not content with the United 
Nations regular voting on the "important question" resolution. They 
17GAOR Sixteenth Session (1079th Plenary Meeting, December 4, 
1961), P• 914° 
18Yearbook of the United Nations, 1961, p. 127. 
l9GAOR Twentieth Session, October ?-November 29, 1965 (lJc?_prd 
Plenary Meeting, November 10, 1965), p. 6. 
20rbid., (1374th Plenary Meeting, November 11, 1965), p. 5. 
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manuevered with some success to have this resolution voted on by the 
General Assembly ahead of the Albanian draft resolution. 
In this continuing fight over what was procedural and what was 
important, the supporters of the "important question'' resolution in 
1968 argued that in the Security Council the question of changing 
the representation of a member state was procedurai,but in the General 
Assembly because of Article 18 (2), a procedural question may be 
treated as an important question. 21 The United States delegate argued 
that what was at stake was the integrity of the United Nations Charter 
and the protection of the sovereign rights of states provided for in 
the two-thirds majority rule, particularly when it dealt-with member-
ship and representation. 22 In 1970, the United States delegate argued 
further that the two-thirds majority rule in Article 18 (2) was a 
"safeguard clause for members of the United Nations against arbitrary 
expulsion. 1123 
The supporters of the Albanian resolution refused to accept this 
, . 
argument, and insisted that the approval of the credentials of the 
representatives of the People's Republic of China was a .procedural 
matter, and contended that for those governments who underwent change, 
a simple majority vote in accordance with the rules of procedure of 
21-yearbook of the United Nations, 1968, p, 134. 
22Ibid. , P• 163. 
2311Representation of China: Assembly Decision," United Nations 
Monthly Chronicle (New York, 1970), VII, No. 11, p. 36. 
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the General Assembly would suffice to approv~ the credentials of their 
delegates. 24 
Another point raised in the discussion of the "important question 
question" resolution was that it would pave the way for two Chinas in 
the United Nations. The USSR in 1962 warn~d the members against the 
plan for two Chinas because it conflicted with common sense and the 
United Nations Charter. The USSR delegate said, 
••• Taiwan is not a state but an integral part of China, 
one of China's provinces, over which the sovereignty of the 
Chinese p:eople will sooner or later be restored. •. • 
Nor does the United Nations Charter permit of two 
interpretations in this matter. Under the Charter (Article 
18), each country-including China--has only one seat and 
one vote in the Organization, and consequently, the Charter 
excludes simultaneous representation of the People's 25 
Republic of China and the supporters of Chiang Kai~shek. 
Albania in 1965 pointed out the absurdity of the two Chinas theory. 
By striving to keep the Chiang Kai-shek clique in the 
Assembly by every possible manuever and subterfuge,. the 
United States is trying to insure its continued occupation 
of Taiwan. But because of the growing opposition to this 
abnormal state of affairs, it has long been trying to gain 
acceptance here for its fallacious theory o26rather its 
plot of "two Chinas" or "China and Taiwan." 
It is true that the United States did not come out openly in 
support of the two Chinas theory, but the "important question" reeo-
lution seemed to contain a latent purpose, that of having both 
Chinese governments represented in the United Nations. In 1966, the 
24Yearbook ~ the United Nations, 1966, P• 134~ 
25GAOR Seventeenth Session, October 5-November 20, 1962 (1156th 
Plenary Meeting, October 22, 1962), p. 549. 
26GAOR Twentieth Session (1369th Plenary Meeting, November 8, 
1965), P• 17. 
United States supported a draft resolution to form a committee to 
study the issue, and in 1968 the United States.delegate expressed 
support for this draft resolution as the proposal would not prejudge 
the outcome of the study. 27 The wording of the operative paragraph 
of this draft resolution closely followed the two Chinas theory as it 
proposed "to work out an equitable and practical solution to the 
Chinese representation question in accordance with the principles and 
purposes of the United Nations Charter. n 28 
While the draft resolution offered a means to clarify and : 
possibly end the existing stalemate, many members doubted its useful-
ness and felt that the proposal was not in a position to produce 
results. Others argued that the purpose of, the resolution was to 
bypass the General Assembly, as the normal procedure would have been 
to resolve questions of representation in the Assembly. To those who 
supported the seating of the People's Republic of China, the study 
committee_proposal was a way for the two Chinas to be in the United 
Nations, while the Republic of China opposed the proposal on the 
grounds that it would pave the way for the entry of the People's 
Republic of China. 29 
This study committee draft resolution was presented in 1966, 1967 
and 1968, and dropped in 1969. According to Italy, one of its ori-
ginal sponsors, "The proposal had not been understood in its true 
27Yearbook of~ United Nations, 1968, p. 163 • 
• 28Yearbook of the United Nations, 1966, p. 134. For text of 
resolution, see Appendix C. 
29Yearbook ~ the United Nations, 1968, p. 134. 
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significance nor had it won sufficient support, 1130 so it was dropped. 
The argument that realism required the seating of the People's 
Republic of China was denounced by those member states who judged the 
Communist Chinese Government on the basis of its adherence to peace, 
its political system and its legality in international law. In 1962 
those countries which supported the "important questionll resolution 
denounced the People's Republic of China for committing aggression 
against India and presented this as another.act in a long record of 
aggressive behavior. The Philippine delegate, while supporting the 
Unit'ed States arguments, noted that the act in question was a breach 
of a bilateral agreement (Pancha Shila) between the People's Republic 
of China and India. The delegate of the Republic of China argued 
that the act in question clearly negated the theory of realism being 
used as an argument for bringing the People's Republic of China to 
the United Nations. India reasserted her commitment to support the 
seating of the People's Republic of China despite the~outbreak of 
hostilities on their border. The Indian delegate reiterated the nee~ 
to bring the representatives of the People's Republic of China into 
the United Nations in order to check China's activities and to make 
it accept its responsibilities as a member. 31 
The People's Republic of China as a reality in the world and its 
adherence to peace were continuously stressed by its supporters. In 
1963 Albania blamed the United States for waging a "fierce campaign 
30Yearbook .£!: the United Nations, 1969, p, 156. 
31GAOR Seventeenth Session (1156th Plenary Meeting, October 22, 
1962), p. 597. 
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of false charges and slander" against the People's Republic of China 
and its peaceful foreign policy. 32 The USSR pointed out the need for 
China .to participate in the settlement of international problems, and 
Czechoslovakia referred to a statement by President Kennedy on 
October 16, 1963 about the inevitability of the participation of the 
People's Republic of China in disarmament negotiations. 33 In answer 
to the charge of aggressive behavior on the part of th~ People's 
Republic of China, the Ceylonese delegate declared that it was 
impossible to treat a country as an outlaw and then expect it to 
behave like a member of society. The delegate insisted that, from 
the legal point of view, there was no other solution except to have 
the People's Republic of China in the United Nations.34 
In 1968 the Albanian delegate, defending China against charges 
of aggression, not only denounced the United States but also the USSR 
for committing aggression in Vietnam and Czechoslovakia respectively. 
He claimed that the collusion of these two powers was responsible for 
the exclusion of the People's Republic of China. He stated, 
••• The aggressive policy of the United States imperialists 
towards China~which was the main cause pf its cu!Tbinued 
exclusion ftom the United Nations--was now being carried 
out with the active cooperation of the Soviet revisionists 
because the People's Republic of China constituted the most 
powerful obstacle to the attainment of a joint g~~ of 
world hegemony by the United States and the USSR. 
32yearbook of the United Nations, 1963, p. 31. 
33GAOR Eighteenth Session, October 14-November ·2;·,·····1963 ( 1244th 
Plenary Meeting, October 17, 1963), p. 3. 
34Yearbook of the United Nations, 1963, p. 34. 
35Yearbook _2f the United Nations, 1968 1 p. 163. 
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The Republic of China delegate harped on the aggressive nature of 
the Communist Chinese regime and claimed that the inherent warlike 
nature of the Communist Government had caused the split -in the 
Communist camp. He also pointed out that Communist China had in 1965 
attacked and abused the United Nations and had called for the for-
mation of a new "revolutionary United Nations. 1136 The delegate also 
stated that the Chinese Communist regime revelled in war, as shown 
by Mao TJse Tungls doctrine, and that it was disintegrating_as a 
result of the cultural revolution then in progress there. The 
cultural revolution became another object for attack against the- .. 
existing political system of the People's Republic of China. 
Mauritania, at the same meeting, stated that membership in the 
United Nations should not be based on the kind of government a state 
had or how it came into being.37 
The old argument of recognition was given a new interpretation 
by the delegate of Haiti: 
••• Restoration of the lawful rights of a state amounts to 
a subtle recognition of a situation in the past, because 
one can only restore what was in existence3~reviously, in 
the sense of bringing action for recovery. 
This statement implied that the delegate· considered membership in the 
United Nations to be tantamount to recognition of the state. The 
, 36GAOR Twentieth Session (1369th Plenary Meeting, November 8, 
1965), p.a. 
37Ibid., (1378th Plenary Meeting, November 16, 1965), p. 2. 
3Sibid., (1377th Plenary Meeting, November 15, 1965), p. 1. 
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representative of Ghana used the law of succession argument to suggest 
membership for both governments • 
• • • By all the tenets of state succession, the People's 
Republic of China was the legal state successor to that 
which had joined the Organization as a founding member. By 
application of the same law of succession, the.effective 
ruling part of that former part of China, called Taiwan was 
the Government of Chi!~ Kai-shek which was entitled to 
continued membership. . 
Although legal arguments based on recognition and state sue-
cession were still being used, the political reality of the People's 
Republic of China was gradually gaining acceptance. In 1969 the 
United States reversed itself on its previous contention that to 
bring in the People's Republic of China would create a disaster in 
the United ~tions. The United States now agreed that it was 
important for mainlap.d China to return to the family of nations, but 
added that the obstacles which it raised to such a return could not 
be ignored, 
••• To allow Peking to come in the United Nations under her 
terms would encourage intransigence, debase the Charter and 
perpetuato a grave injustice against a Member of the United 
Nations. 
In 1970 the United States delegate stated that the United States had 
actively sought ~o move from an era of confrontation to an era of 
negotiation and now agreed to the political reality of the People's 
Republic of China. 41 
39Yearbook; pf the United Nations, 1968, p. 156._ 
r-- -
40United Nations Monthly Chronicle, VI, No. 10 (December 1969), 
p. 10. 
41united Nations Monthly Chron:1.cle, VII, No. 11 (December 1970), 
P• 37° 
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Those members who supported the Albanian resolution identified 
realism with the principle of universality. Although this principle 
does not appear in the United Nations Charter, those who favored the 
seating of the People's Republic of China kept arguing the principlei 
of universality until their argument gained acceptance by the United 
States and its allies. They argued that the "important'" question" 
resolution was contrary to the principle of universality. In memo-
randa submitted by this group of states to the General Assembly "to 
restore the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China," the 
following clause was always included, 
• • • The refusal to restore those rights, • • .• was an 
extreme denial of justice and inconsistent with an 
essential pr~~iple of the United Nations, namely 
universality. 
Mr. Yost, representative of the United States, replying in 1966 to the 
argument of universality, had this to say: 
The argument for universality, moreover runs, counter 
to the Charter by depriving this Organization of the 
right to pass judgment required by the Charter, on whether 
a state is able and willing to carry out the obligations 
of the Charter. Carried to its logical conclusion, that 
argument would mean membership for every Government which 
exercises the attributes of sovereignty regardless of how 
it came to power and regardless of its international 
conduct. This was clearly not the view of the authors of 
the Charter, or they would not have included Article 4 
which clearly lays down certain criteria for membership. 43 
42Memorandurn to the General Assembly in August 1966 submitted by 
Algeria, Cambodia, the Congo (Brazaville), Cuba, Guinea, Mali, 
Rumania, and Syria. Yea!_'~ of the United Nations, 1966, p. 133. 
43GAOR Twentieth Session (1379th Plenary Meeting, November 16, 
1965), P• 4. 
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Australia, Japan, and Thailand argued that the question of 
Chinese representation could not be solved merely by expelling one of 
the two parties directly concerned, for such action would inevitably 
increase tension in East Asia and have the effect of disturbing 
rather than stabilizing the world situation.44 The delegate of the 
Philippines criticized the logic of those who advocated the principle 
of universality on grounds that while seeking the admission of the 
People' s Republic of China, they would expel the Republic of China. 45 
Similar views were expressed by Great Britain, Canada, Austria, Italy 
and Peru, all members who were in favor of the seating of the:. 
People's Republic of China. For them, universality was a desirable 
goal but not at the expense of the expulsion of the representatives 
of a member state. This point was clearly revealed in 1971 when the 
United States and its allies sponsored the draft resolutions for 
dual representation and the "important question. II 
The Proposal of Dual Representation 
The United States had in 1970 not fully concurred with the 
seating of the People's Republic of China although Secretary Rogers 
stated that, as a general policy, the Nixon administration felt that 
it was impossible for the People's Republic of China to be isolated. 
Even after the United Nations gave the China seating.resolution a 
44Yearbook of the United Nations, 1968, p. 163. 
45United Nations Monthly Chronicle, VII, No. 11 (December 1970), 
P• 35° 
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simple majority in 1970, President Nixon stated that there was no 
plan to change United States policy with regard to the admission of 
the People's Republic of China.46 
President Nixon's foreign policy report to Congress on 
february 25, 1971 expressed the need to establish more dialogue with 
Peking, but rejected the idea of its hegemony over Asia. Nixon 
cautiously added, "But neither do we impose on China an international 
position that denies her legitimate national interests."47 He 
inferred that Peking could come into the United Nations when he said 
that China could play a "constructive role in the family of : 
nations."48 
At President Nixon's press conference on June 2i, 1971, the 
President declared that United States policy announcements concerning 
Chinese representation would soon be made following consultations 
with the Republic of China. Then came Kissinger's trip to Peking and 
the announcement of a forthcoming visit by President Nixon to China. 
On August 23 Secretary Rogers announced the new United States policy ., 
on Chinese representation • 
• The United States accordingly will support action in 
the General Assembly this fall calling for the seating of 
the People's Republic of China. At the same time, the 
46"President Nixon's Conference of December 10, 1970," Bulletin, 
LXIII, No. 1644 (December 28, 1970), p. 772. 
47Richard M. Nixon, "United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's 
Building for Peace," (A Report to the Congress on February 25, 1971), 
Bulletin, LXIV, No. 1656 (March 22, 1971), p. 383. 
48Ibid. 
United States will oppose any action to expel the Republic 
of China or otht9'1ise deprive it of representation in the 
United Nations. 
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As to China's seat in the Security Council, the Secretary added that 
the United States would abide by the views of the majority of nations. 
According to him, the change in United States policy was the result 
of the favorable attitude of the People's Republic of China toward 
the United Nations, its interest in membership, its attitude toward 
other governments, and its improved relations with the United 
States. 50 
The following discussion of the proceedings during the twenty-
sixth plenary session of the General Assembly held, in the fall of 1971 
is an attempt to explain what happened and to try to find out whether 
the defeat of the United States resolution was a defeat for the 
United States and whether the United States had a hand in the seating 
of the People's Republic of China. 
In the General Committee, which, as reported earlier, deals with 
the agenda of the General Assembly, the United States tried to have 
its two Chinas resolution and the Albanian resolution combined in 
order to insure their simultaneous discussion in the General Assembly. 
This was defeated. Albania then sought to exclude the United States 
resolution from the General Assembly agenda but its attempt was voted 
4911President Nixon's News Conference of June·. ;I:, 11 • ( Excerpts from) 
Transcripts), Bulletin, LXIV, No. 1669 (June 21, 1971), p. 790. 
5011Secretary Rogers Announces United Stat~s Policy on Chinese 
Representation in the United Nations, 11 Bulletitl, LXV, No. 1678 
(August 23, 1971), P• 193. 
down.51 Thereupon,the General Committee submitted the three draft 
resolutions to the General Assembly. 52 
55 
During the plenary meetings, after what seems to have been a good 
deal of lobbying and arm-,twisting, the United States moved the ac-
ceptance of its draft resolution. The ~ York Times ~ad this to say 
about the United States tactics: 
••• The United States experienced d:U'ficulty in obtaining 
co-sponsors from the outset like Japan. Australia and 
New Zealand agreed to put in a specific ass53tion that 
Peking would get the Security Council seat. 
Secretary Rdgers warned some delegates that Congress might cut off 
United States financial support to the United Nations. 54 New York 
Senator James Buckley warned that if Taiwan was ousted, he would call 
for a dramatic reduction of United States financial support of the 
United Nations. 55 On October 18 U~ted States Ambassador George B~sh 
told the General Assembly that the United States proposal for dual 
representation was not intended to have two Chinas but provi~ed a 
system for the proper representation of China. In support of this, 
5lTime Magazine (October 14, 1971), P• 29. 
52The Albanian draft resolution to seat the representatives of 
the People's Republic of China; United States "important question" 
draft resolution and the proposal to seat both the People's Republic 
of China and the Republic of China in the United Nations. For text of 
the Albanian resolution, see Appendix D. 
5311Tactics Left United States on the Defensive," New York Times 
(October 26, 1971), p. 10. ~ ~ 
54"After Saigon, Peking Ahead," Time Magazine (October 18, 1971), 
P• 32. 
55rbid., (October 25, 1971), p. 26. 
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he cited the flexibility of the Charter in allowing the representation 
of Byelorussia, Ukraine and the USSR. He said that the draft reso-
lution, 
••• does not in any way purport to divide China into two 
separate states or to commit those who vote for it on how 
they may in the future regard the legal or the diplomatic 
situation of the parties involved. It does not take 
either a "two-Chinas" position or a "one-China, one-
Taiwan" position or in any way seek to dismember China. 
It is simply founded on the reality of the present 
situation as we all know it to be, but i 56does not seek 
to freeze this situation for the future. 
No lengthy debates took place compared to the previous sessions.: 
On October 25 Albania manuevered the early voting of··the draft reso-
lutions despite a Saudi Arabian motion to postpone the voting until 
the next day. The "important question" resolution waif voted first, 
and was defeated by 55 in favor, 59 opposed, with 15 abstentions. 
Eight nations, Belgium, Cyprus, Laos, Qatar, Senegai, Togo, Trinidad-
Tobago and Tunisia, who were thought to be either leaning to or 
supporting the United States, abstained. 57 The Nationalist Chinese 
delegates walked out before a vote was taken on the Albanian reso-
lution to seat the People's Republic of China, which turned out to be 
76 in favor, 35 opposed with 17 abstentions. The draft resolution for 
dual representation was not put to the vote. 
There were mixed reactions in the United States over the vote. 
Conservatives were for the withdrawal of some United Nations funds, 
I 
561'tJnited Nations Votes to Seat Peopla! s Re,public-"_oJ China and 
Expel Representatives of Republic of China," (Statement by Ambassador 
George Bush and Text of Resolution), Bulletin, LXV, No. · 1640, 
(November 15, 1971), p. 18 •. 
. 5711 . . . . . . ·-
United ijations Votes 76-35 to Seat Pekirig and Expel Taipei'-' 
New York Times (October 26, 1971), p. 10. 
moderates were reticent, and others warned against retaliation.58 
Secretary Rogers stated, 
••• Although we believe that a mistake of major proportion 
has been made in expelling the Republic of China from the 
United Nations, the United States recognized that the will 
of a majority of the members ~~s been express~d. We, of 
course, accept that decision. 
57 
He stated further that relations with the Republic of China would not 
be affected by the vote in question. In answer to charges made that 
the United States did not exert enough effort to ensure the adoption 
of its resolution the State Department Bulletin had this to say: 
••• In New York, Secretary Rogers met formally with ninety-
two foreign ministers and heads of delegations to seek 
support for the United States sponsored resolutions. In 
addition, the Secretary wrote to more than sixty foreign 
ministers and spoke to others by long distance telephone. 
The Department of State and its embassies around the world 
pressed the campaign. In the United Nations, Ambassador 
Bush and his staff explained the new approacg0and sought 
the support of some one hundred delegations. 
Various delegations voiced the opinion that the United States 
had not acted strongly for the adoption of its proposal to seat both 
governments. First, they cited the main weakness in the American 
position, which many governments saw as a halfway house--a makeshift 
compromise--that was likely to be abandoned in one or two more years 
5811steamroller Tactics of United States Are Blamed for Defeat," 
~ York Times (October 27, 1971), p. 16. 
5911Secretary Rogers Discusses United Nations Decision on Chinese 
Representation," (Transcript of News Conference), Bulletin, LXV, 
No. 1690 (November 15, 1971), P• 541. 
6011united States Policy and Chinese Representation," United 
States,_E.oreign Policy 1971: !_ Report of the §.ecretary of State, 
Department of State Publication 863 (March 1972), p. 277. 
as President Nixon drove for better relations with Peking, 61 and 
consequently, those who had recently entered into diplomatic relations 
with Peking would suffer the consequences. Second, there were 
inherent contradictions in the United States strategy. Some said that 
the Nixon administration was determined to retain Taiwan, while others 
called it blackmail and predicted that it would backfire. 62 They 
could not explain how Ambassador Bush would be campaigning for votes, 
while Kissinger was in Peking at the President's bidding. Others 
pointed out that the Nixon visit to Peking could not take place had 
the United Nations decided against Peking. Third, the "important 
question" resolution, a device used for so many years to keep Peking 
out of the United Nations, was now being used to retain Taiwan. 
Delegates were convinced that the People's Republic of China would 
not come to the United Nations unless the Republic of China was 
expelled, and the Albanians were busy telling other delegations that 
it was the opportune time to bring in Peking. Fourth, Bush and his 
staff were accused of either applying too much or too little pressure 
on the delegations. 63 
United States pressure on its smaller allies was greater than 
on its bigger allies like the NATO countries. Great Britain, which 
had previously voted for both the "important question"·and the 
61New York Times (October 18, 1971), P• 8. -----
6211united States Warning on Taiwan Ouster," New York Times 
(October 12, 1971), p. 11. 
63Newsweek Magazine (November 8, 1971), p. 23. 
59 
Albanian resolutions, managed this time to vote o'nly for the Albanian 
resolution. The British delegate explained that before, the United 
States was categorically opposed to the seating of Peking, but now the 
United States was proposing to seat Peking. 64 He cited President 
Nixon's diplomacy with Peking and the result of the vote of the 
Albanian resolution in 1970 as reasons for the change in the British 
stand. It is said that Ghana was made to vote for the United States 
resolution despite voting for the Albanian resolution in 1970. 
Reports of United States pressure came mostly from third world states. 
It is clear then that United States action made the seating of 
the People's Republic of China a for~gone conclusion. How the United 
States was able to maintain the "important question" resolution in 
the General Assembly will be shown in the following tables giving 
the voting patterns in the General Assembly. 65 The same table will 
give the votes on the Russian and Albanian resolutions to seat the 
People's Republic of China, and the resolution to establish a study 
committee. Member states will be divided by blocs following the 
same system adopted in Chapter two. Due to the large number of 
Afro-Asian bloc members, the table will be further subdivided in 
terms of geographical areas: South and East Asia, the Middle East 
and North Africa, and Africa. 
65Halpern, pp. 505-507, New York Times (October 26, 1971), p. 1, 
United Nations Monthly Chronidle (December 1970), and Yearbook of the 
United Nations (1961-1963, 1965-1969). 
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8Ear1y in .1965, Indonesia withdrw trom the United Nat~cms because ot the election of *1ap1i.,. with' which ;[ndone~ia -D engaged 
in ·a "confrontation," to the Securit7. ,Co\ll'\Cil. Indoneaia returned to th6 UIµ,ted HatiQna :l,n. 1966. • 
bin 1958, ~ and S,ria ror""'1 tho United Arob. Ropl!bl.ia, and S,ria l!IIV&,;, her soot in,tho Gon&Nl Ao•~· That union wao 
dissolved in 4961. S)'ria then r¢urned to i,he Aseed>ly as an in:iepel'¥ient.·country,, bU:'t Egypt r,tained. the name 
"United Arab Republic." · 
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cCm,g~ (Leopoldville) was the. former name ot ~ongo (Kinshasa), 81'Jd recently the statels· Ml1l8 was changed to Zaire. 






































































"Malaysia was for~· in 1963 by the union ot Malaya, Singapore Sarawak, a..i Sa~ (North Borneo)·, but Malaya had been• a,eni,er 
ot the United Nationa since. 1957. · 1'1e votes listed tor 1957-t2 ars thoas ot Malaya, also sso t. 
!Singapore ~-tee! from the Fsderaticm ot Malaysia and became an ~lipandent state. It became a mambar ot the United Nationa 
on S_eptember 21; 1965; 
&rhe independent states of Tanganyilal and. Z~ibar united in .A,j>ril_ 1964;. and the new _state· was renamed Tanzania· in October ot 
that year. At the time of the ,µ,ion, both Tang&~ and ·Zanzibar )fere ~s ot the Uaj.ted Naticns, but; onl:y Tanganyika 
had been a member lm,g enough to vote on resolutions to soat the representative• ot the Peoplel • !lepublic or China. The 
votes for 1962-63 · ere Tanga~l:s. 
hsouth Africa broke away trom the Comnomrealth when it became a republic-on May 31, 1961. 
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Patterns of Voting 
Cuba was treated as belonging to the Soviet bloc after its 
government turned communist in 1959. The Soviet bloc states voted 
consistently against the "important question" resolution for a study 
committee. The bloc voted consistently for the resolution to seat the 
People's Republic of China. 
In the Western European bloc, Belgium, Greece, Iceland, 
Luxembourg, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United 
Kingdom voted consistently for the "important question" resolution. 
France voted for it from 1961-63 but changed in 1965. Denmark, 
Finland, France, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and Yugoslavia 
voted consistently for the Albanian resolution. As can be seen, the 
United Kingdom voted in favor of both the "important question" and 
Albanian resolutions since 1961, but in 1971 it voted against the 
former and in favor of the latter. As to the study committee reso-
lution, half of the Western bloc was in favor and half was against. 
Austria and Portugal abstained from all three resolutions until 
Austria began to vote for both the "important question" and Albanian 
resolutions in 1970 and Portugal did so in 1971. In the 1971 voting, 
only four members of this bloc voted in favor of the "important 
question," namely Greece, Luxembourg, Portugal, and Spain, and the 
rest voted for the Albanian resolution except for three who abstained, 
namely Greece, Luxembourg, and Spain. 
The "important question" resolution had the continued support of 
the Latin-American bloc. Except for some abstentions by Bolivia, 
Ecuador and Peru, the Albanian resolution did not get any support 
until 1970 when Chile voted in favor of it because of its Marxist 
oriented government. In 1971 this resolution had the support of 
Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, and Peru. The study. committee resolution 
was favored by most of the La.tin-American bloc states. 
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In the Afro-Asian bloc, the South and East Asian countries, 
namely Japan, the Philippines and Thailand voted consistently for the 
"important question" resolution and against the Albanian resolution. 
Afghanistan, Bhutan, Burma and Nepal voted consistently for the 
Albanian resolution and against the "important question" resolution. 
Cambodia supported the Albanian resolution from 1961-69, but changed 
in 1970-71 to support the "important question" resolution. 
Indonesia's vote was in favor of the Albanian resolution from 1961-63, 
but after withdrawing in 1965 and then returning to the United 
Nations, it voted in favor of the "important question" in 1966 and 
1967, did not vote from 1968-70, and in 1971 voted in favor of both 
resolutions. Laos supported the "important question" in 1965-70, but 
opposed it to vote for the Albanian resolution in 1971. Maldives 
voted for the "important question" from 1966-69, but· did not vote for 
both resolutions in 1970 and 1971. Most of the South and East Asian 
states were against the study committee resolution. -
Of the Middle East and North African states, Jordan, Saudi 
Arabia, Lebanon, and Turkey consistently voted in favor of the 
"important question" resolution, although Turkey voted against it in 
1971. Algeria, Iraq, Southern Yemen, Syria, the United Arab 
Republic, and Yemen continuously voted for the Albanian resolution. 
Iran's record shows a number of abstentions. Kuwait and Libya first 
voted for the "important question," but later changed to vote for the 
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Alpanian resolution. In 1971 most of these states voted for the 
Albanian resolution except for Jordan, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia. The 
new states admitted to the United Nations in 1971, like Bahrain, 
Oman, and Qatar either abstained or did not vote. Most of the 
Middle East and North African states did not support the study com-
mittee resolution~ 
Among the African states, the Central African Republic, Chad, 
Congo (Kinshasa), Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Madagascar, 
Niger, Rwanda, Togo, and Upper Volta voted consistently for the 
"important question" resolution. Those who voted consistently for 
the Albanian resolution were Burundi, Congo (Brazaville), Ethiopia, 
Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Somalia, and Sudan. Cameroun, Equatorial 
Guinea and Senegal shifted in their voting from in favor to against 
on the "important question" resolution. In 1971, no change occurred 
as states maintained their record of either voting for the "important 
question" or the Albanian resolution. The study committee resolution 
did not have the support of the African states. 
Of the Commonwealth bloc states, the United Kingdom, Australia, 
Canada, Barbados, Bostwana, Fiji, Gambia, Guyana, Jamaica, Lesotho, 
Malawi, Malta, Mauritius, New Zealand, Swaziland and Trinidad-Tobago 
voted consistently for the "important question" resolution. Ceylon, 
India, Kenya, Nigeria, Pakistan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia voted 
consistently for the Albanian resolution. Those states which shifted 
their votes were Cyprus, Ghana, Malaysia, Sierra Leone and Singapore. 
In 1971 most states changed to vote for the Albanian resolution. The 
study committee was opp:osed by most of these states. 
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The non-bloc states like Israel, the Republic of -China, South 
Africa and the United States voted consistently in favor of the 
"important question" resolution and against the Albanian resolution. 
In 1971 Israel voted in favor of the Albanian resolution while the 
Republic of China withdrew before a yote on the Albanian resolution 
was taken. Israel and the United States supported the study com-
mittee, but the Republic of Ch~ and South Africa were against it. 
From the table totals, in 1961 the "important question" reser 
lution had more votes than the Albanian resolution. Voting in 
1962-63 was confined to the Albanian resolution and the:i-e was a 
minimal increase in its favor. In 1965 support for the "important 
question" resolution decreased by five votes compared to~that of 
1961, while there was a tie betw.een the for and against vote on the 
Albanian resolution. If we compare the votes cast in favor of the 
"important question" resolution and the Albanian resolution, the 
former had 21 votes ntore in 1966, 24 votes more in 1967, 29 votes 
more in 1968, 15 votes more in 1969, and 15 votes more in 1970. In 
the 1970 vote, the Albanian resolution had a simple majority for the 
first time. In 1971 it had 21 votes more than the "important 
question" resolution. 
Beginning in 1969, the "important question" resolution showed 
a decrease of votes favoring it because some of those.who had 
supported it began to support the Albanian resolution following the 
establishment of diplomatic relations by their governments with the 
People's Republic of China. In 1971 many states, particularly those 
of the Western European bloc and the Commonwealth bloc, voted in 
favor of the Albanian resolution.because of the new United States 
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policy. The growth of membership in the United Nations seems to 
have increased for a while the number of votes cast for the "irrt-
portant question" resolution, but this seems to have changed in 1968. 
Some states changed their voting record following a change of 
government~ with some learui..ng to the West and others to Communism, 
such as Cambodia, Cuba, Chile, Indonesia, and Laos~ 
While the record of voting in the General Assembly 1ndicates 
the extent of support given to the three draft resolutions, another 
indicator of support is the list of member states that sponsored 
each draft resolution. The following tables show thit' the 
"important question" and Albanian resolutions had almost an equal 




SPONSORS OF RESOLUTIONS ON THE CHINA QUESTION 
1961. 1962 1963 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 
Albania 
Algeria 
Australia x x x x x x x x 
Belgium x* x* * Bolivia x* x x x 




Chile * * * 
Colombia x x x x x x 
Congo (Brazaville) 
Costa Rica x x x 
Cuba 
Dominican Republic x 
El Salvador x 
F.quatorial Guinea 
Fiji x 








Italy x x x* x* x* 
Japan x x x x x x x x 
Lesotho x x x 
Liberia x 
Luxembl)l!rg * * 
Madagascar x x x x x x 






New Zealan:I x x x x x x 
Nicaragua x x x x x x x 
Pakistan 
Paraguay x x 




Spain x x 
Sudan 
Swazilan:1 x x x 
Syria 
Tanzania 
Thailand x x x x x x x 
Trinidad-Tobago * 






Key: --resolution to seat the People's R!!J)ublic of China 
ll""important question" resolution 
*•resolution to establish a study committee on the Chinese representation question 




The discussion of the actions and arguments in the United Nations 
General Assembly from 1950 to 1971 was intended to show how the United 
States maintained its position of excluding the People's Republic of 
China from the councils of the international organization. The United 
States used both political manuevers and legal arguments to sub-
stantiate its actions and secure enough votes to keep the Chinese 
Communists out. Finally, when the United States could no longer 
cont1rol a favorable vote, and because the United States had embarked 
on a new policy vis-a-vis the Chinese Communists dramatized by 
President Nixon's visit to Peking, it was inevitable that the People's 
Republic of China would be seated in the United Nations. 
When the Communists took over mainland China, the tlnited States 
seemed to have been taken by surprise and to have written off the 
Nationalist Chinese. Factors that contributed to the adoption of 
stringent policies toward the People's Republic of Ch1na in the fifties 
were congressional dislike of certain actions of the ·Truman adminis-
tration, the work of the China Lobby in the United States, and the 
People's Republic of China's intervention in the Korean War, which 
made the United States come to the conclusion that China~was an enemy 
with aggressive designs in Southeast Asia, and was in collusion with 
the USSR. This is why it became the announced policy of the United 
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States to contain communism within mainland China, and try to destroy 
it there by means of strict isolation, The United States wanted to 
use China as an example to other countries to deter them from 
accepting communism. 
The United States decision to sanction the Pe'ople' s Republic of 
China and restrain it from further aggressive acts was manifested by 
continued action in the United Nations to prevent th:e recognition of 
the People's Republic of China as the legitimate representative of the 
state of China, The United States was pursuing this policy in 
furtherance of the national interest based on the assumption that 
China's action in Asia constituted a threat to that interest and could 
prevent the realization of United States goals in Asia. 
The United States representatives in the United Nations adopted 
their tactics to accommodate to the changes of attitudes-and member-
ship within the United Nations. At the beginning, the United States 
manuevered tohave the General Committee of the United Nations, which 
handles the agenda of the General Assembly, to recommend that no 
action be taken to seat the representatives of the People's Republic 
of China. This was the period of the moratorium, during which the 
United States managed to keep the issue off the agenda of the General 
Assembly ·in spite of the pressures of the_ pro-China :group. Some 
discussion took place in the General Assembly while the report of the 
General Committee was being considered. The United States and its 
supporters presented a number of legal arguments based on the concepts 
of de facto control, recognition, legality through democratic 
elections, peace-loving, and fulfil1~nt of international obligations. 
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In 1960, as a result of the influx of new members which in part 
was responsible for the failure of the General Committee's report to 
win a simple majority for the first time, the United States abandoned 
its moratorium policy. The following year, the United States came up 
with a new procedural strategy to block the seating of Communist 
China. This started the second period which lasted from 1961 to 1970, 
The United States argued that the issue was an important question and 
presented a resolution to the General Assembly to treat it as such. 
The General Assembly, by adopting the "important que1;1tion" resolution, 
bound itself to a procedural requirement that to change the repre-
sentation of China would require a majority of two-thirds of the 
votes. 
During the period of the "important question" policy which, one 
should point out, also coincided with United States-People's Republic 
of China talks in Warsaw, the United States resorted to numerous 
legal arg,.;unents in the General Assembly to induce the latter to vote 
against the seating of the People's Republic of China and the 
expulsion of the Republic of China. These arguments dealt mainly 
with the legal requirements of membership, such as the legality of the 
regime, recognition, peace-loving, fulfilment of international 
obligations, and how universality precJ;udes the expulsion of a member. 
The year 1970 marked the onset of change. With President 
Nixon's new policy toward China based on negotiation and not confron-
tation, more countries began to recognize the Communist regime in 
China, and the split between the USSR and the People's Republic of 
China was becoming clearly irreparable. In this atmosphere, the 
General Assembly again passed the "important question" resolution but, 
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this time, the Albanian resolution received a simple majority vote for 
the first time. The international scene was set for change. 
Early in 1971, the United States, following secret contacts with 
Peking, announced that President Nixon would visit China. Soon one 
development followed another. The United States announced its 
intention not to object to the seating of the People's Republic of 
China but added that such action should not mean the expulsion of the 
Republic of China. In the United Nations, the United States fought 
a rearguard action to implement this new policy and went as far as 
threatening both the United Nations and member states. The United 
States, nevertheless, failed to force the General Assembly to accept 
its two Chinas policy, and the Assembly went ahead and seated the 
People's Republic of China. The issue which had plagued the United 
Nations for so many years was no longer an issue. 
It is clear that the United States had ably utilized all the 
political and legal methods available to her to keep the People's 
Republic of China out of the United Nations. The political manuevers 
were evidently more effective than the legal arguments used. What 
appeared to many to be a defeat for the United States was actually a 
change in the foreign policy of the United States coincident with a 
change in mood in the United Nations. The United states policy of 
containment and isolation had become outmoded and there was a need to 
reappraise United States policy toward China in the light of the 
changing situation in the Far East and the reality of the split 
between the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union. The 
rapprochement with the People's Republic of China might have been 
motivated by United States interest in having an understanding with 
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Communist China in the Vietnam negotiations, or a policy assumption 
that a detente with the two Communist powers would widen the split 
between the USSR and the People's Republic of China. This is why the 
commitment to support the Nationalist Government in the United Nations 
became secondary to the United States' interest to draw the People's 
Republic of China into closer diploma.tic relations. 
This thesis has relied ma.inly on an analysis of the proceedings 
of the General Assembly and the conclusions reached were derived from 
this analysis. It would be of interest that further in-depth study 
of the Chinese representation controversy be made focusing on the 
roles played by the Republic of China and the People's Republic of 
China. Due to the unavailability at present of United States 
documents, it is difficult to state exactly why the United States 
changed its position in the United Nations, and what has really taken 
place between the United States and the People's Republic of China, and 
between the United States and the Republic of China before the United 
States changed its policy and decided to let the People's Republic of 
China secure the United Nations seat after years of unending political 
and legal ma.nuevering to keep that Asian giant out of the councils of 
the world organization. 
A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 
American Foreign Policy Current Documents. Washington D. C.: U. S. 
Government Printing Office, 1959, 1963. 
Appleton, Sheldon. The Eternal Triangle. East Lansing: Michigan 
University Press, 1961. 
Barnett, A. Doak in Blum, Robert. Ed. The United States and China in 
World Affairs. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1966:-- -
Bishop, Donald G. The Administration of United States Foreign Policy 
Through~ United Nations. Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana 
Publications, Inc., 1967. 
Halpern, A. M. Policies Toward China. New York: McGraw-Hill Book 
Co., 1965. 
Hovet, Thomas Jr. Bloc Politics in the United Nations. Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Pres~1960. 
Iriye, Akira. Ed. United States Policy Toward China. Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company, 1968. 
Linebarger, Paul M. A. "The Two Chinas." Current History, XI..VII, 
No. 277 (September 1964), 162-165. 
Lung Chu-Chen and Laswell, Harold D. Formosa, China and the United 
Nations~ New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 196;:;-;- --
Newsweek Magazine, November 8, 1971. 
New York Times, October 12-27, 1971. 
Petrov, Vladimir• What China Policy? Harnden, Conn. : Shoe String 
Press, 1961. 
Peyton, Patricia Ann. "The Evolution and Importance of the General 
Committee of the United Nations General Assembly." (Unpub. M. A. 
thesis, Purdue University, 1963). 
Poynter, Henrietta. Ed. China and United States ~ East Policy 
1945-1960. Washington D. c::- Congressional Quarterly Service, 
1967.-
7'3 
Russell, Ruth B. The United Nations~ United States Securitl 
Policy. Washington D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 19 8. 
Schick, F. B. "The Question of China in the United Nations." The 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly. IV, Part 4 
{October 1963):-- -
Spanier, John w. American Foreign Policy Since World War II. New 
York: Frederick C. Praeger, Publisher, 1968. 
74 
Steele, A. T. The American People and China. New York: McGraw-Hill 
Book Co., 1966. -
~ Magazine, October 14, 18, 25, 1971. 
United Nations Decisions~ the Fifth and Sixth Regular Sessions. 
New York: U. N. Publications, 1952. 
United Nations Monthly Chrond.c.le. VII, VIII. New York: Ul. N. 
Publications, 1970, 1971. 
United Nations Official Records of the General Assembly. New York: 
U. N. Publications, 1950-196°3, 1965. 
United Nations Official Records of~ General Assembly Annexes. 
New York: u. N. Publications, 1961, 1966. 
United States Foreign Policy 1971: ! Report £Y the Secretary of State. 
Washington D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1972. 
United States Participation in the United Nations: Report £Y the 
President to the Congress for the Year 1960. Washington D. C.: 
u. s. Government Printing Office, 1961. -
U. S. The Department of State Bulletin. JCX;-LXV. Washington D. c.: 
u. S. Government Printing Office, 1950-1971. 
U. S. The Department of State Publication 5383. Washington D. C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1954. 
u. S. News. No. 34 (May 22, 1953). 
Yearbook of the United Nations. New York: U. N. Publications, 
1961=I9b37 1965-1969. 
Walch, J. Weston. Complete Handbook~ Recognition of Communist 
China. Portland, Maine: J. Weston Walch Publisher, 1954. 
75 
Werners, S. E. The Presiding Officers in the United Nations. 
Haarlern: DeErven F. Bohn N. V. , F]67-
Whelan, . Joseph G. "The United States and Diplomatic Recognition: 
The Contrasting Cases of Russia and Communist China." The china 
Quarterly. No. 5 (January-March 1961), 62-89. 
APPENDIX A 
DOCUMENT A/1.360 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: 
Draft Resolution 
[27 October 1961] 
The General Assembly, 
Bearing in mind that only representatives of the Government of 
People's Republic of China are competent to occupy China's place in 
the United Nations and all its organs, 
Resolves to remove immediately from all United Nations organs 
the representatives of the Chiang Kai-shek clique who are un-
lawfully occupying the place of China in the United Nations, 
Invites the Government of the People's Republic of China to send 
its representatives to paJ;"ticipate in th~ work of the United Nations 
and of all its organs. 
DOCUMENT A/1.375 
Cambodia, Ceylon and Indonesia: Amendment 
to Document A/1.360 
[12 December 1961] 
Delete operative paragraph and substitute the following: 
Decides in accordance with the above declaration that the 
representatives of the Government of the People's Republic of China 
be seated in the United Nations and all its organs. 
Source: GA.OR Sixteenth Session Annexes (Agendas 90 and 91), III 
TI9l)'l), p. 2. 
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APPENDIX B 
RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
1668 (XVI) Representation of China 
in the United Nations 
The General Assembly, -- . 
Noting that a serious diver~ence of views exists among Member 
States concerning the representation of a founder Member who is named 
in the Charter of the United Nations, 
Recalling that this matter has been described repeatedly in the 
General Assembly by all segments of opinion as vital and crucial and 
that on numerous occasions its inclusion in the agenda has been 
requested under rule 15 of the Assembly's rules of procedure as an 
item of an important and urgent character, 
Recalling further the recommendation contained in its resolution 
396 (V) of 14 December 1950 that, whenever more than one authority 
claims to be the government entitled to represent a Member State in 
the United Nations and this question becomes the subject of contro-
versy in the United Nations, the question should be considered in the 
light of the purposes and principles of the Charter and the circum-
stances of each case, 
Decides, in accordance with Article 1$ of the· charter of the 
United Nations, that any proposal to change the representation of 
China is an important question. 
Source: Ibid., P• 3. 
?? 
1080th plenary meeting 
!.2. December 1961 
APPENDIX C 
DOCUMENT A/L.500 
Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Italy and 
Trinidad and Tobago: Draft Resolution 
[21 November 1966] 
The General Assembly, 
Having considered the question of the representation of China, 
Believipg that a solution of the question of Chinese repre-
sentation which accords with the principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations and the aim of universality, would further the purposes 
of the United Nations and strengthen its ability to maintain inter-
national peace and security, 
Believing that the complexities of this question require the most 
searching consideration in order to pave the way to an appropriate 
solution, taking into account the existing situation and the political 
realities of the area, 
1. Decides to establish a committee of ••• Member States, to be 
appointed by the General Assembly, with the mandate of exploring and 
studying the situation in all its aspects in order to make the 
appropriate recommendation~ to the General Assembly at its twenty-
second session for an equitable and practical solution to the 
question of the representation of China in the United Nations, in 
keeping with the purposes and principles of the Charter; 
2. Appeals to all Governments concerned to give assistance to 
the committee in search for a solution. 
Source: GAOR )enty-First Session Annexes (Agenda Item 90), III 
"{19b6, P• 3. 
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APPENDIX D 
RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
2758 (XXVI) Assembly Decides to Restore Its 
Rights to People's Republic of China 
~ General Assembly, 
Recalling the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, 
Considering that the restoration of the lawful rights of the 
People' s Republic of China is essential both for the protection of< the 
Charter of the United Nations and for the cause that the United 
Nations must serve under the Charter, 
Recognizing that the representatives of the Gqvernment of the 
People's Republic of China are the only lawful representatives of 
China to the United Nations and .that the People's Republic of China 
is one of the five permanent members of the Security Council, 
Decides to restore all its rights to the People's Republic of 
China and to recognize the representatives of its Government as the 
only legitimate representatives of China to the United.Nations, and 
to expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-she.k from the 
place which they unlawfully occupy at the United Nations and in all 
the organization related to it. 
26 October 1971 
Source: United Nations Monthly Chronicle, VIII, No. 10 (November 
1971), P• 61. . . 
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